Irish Times article
I set out below an article written by Ed Moloney, who needs no introduction to scholars of the history of the Troubles.
Whether or not the letter is genuine, it raises, again, the question of the participation of State forces in the activities of PIRA.
Supporters of the Republican cause, including many lawyers, describe this as “collusion”.
It has been noticeable, in the articles written for the Newsletter , that not one participant has touched on this issue.
Instead it rolled out the usual State actors , like Collins and Matchett.
Equally, I am not aware of any “victims’” organisation exploring this issue at all.
The explanation, partly, may be the placing of ex State actors within these organisations. Take SEFF, it employs Peter Murtagh, ex State Spook. I’ve listened to SEFF’s pitch for victims and nowhere in it does it even acknowledge the possibility that State actors were involved with PIRA. The focus is mainly on PIRA killings of the security forces.
As always, Dear Reader, I urge you to judge for yourself.
Readers of this blog will know that my basic premise is that , my parents’ murders included, the State permitted or acquiesced in the deaths of its citizens “for the greater good”.
Let me again follow the logic.
You are a handler. Your tout/informer/agent-it matters not on the nomenclature, has risen to an important role within PIRA. He is part of the targeting, planning and execution process. He is telling you who are in the ASUs, who the Quartermaster is, where the explosives are stored and who is making the bombs. If you act on this information, you could disrupt activity by seizing the Semtex. You will have no evidence to put before a court , because the Supergrass system has been discredited and in any event your informer is unwilling to give evidence.
Alternatively, you could act to thwart the operations that your informer tells you about. After a few failures, PIRA are going to put two and two together and that’s the end of your informer.
So , in the grand scheme, some attacks have to get through.
A value judgement has to be made. Who do we sacrifice “for the greater good”?
Not Bobby Carswell, Jeffrey Donaldson, Gerry Adams, Brian Gillen or …
As the former head of MI5 said, life can be messy.
Some unimportant people have to be sacrificed to protect the informer. The higher up in the chain of command is the informer, the greater the ‘product’ and the greater the need to protect him.
That’s my theory, Dear Reader. So let’s test some aspects of it.
What rules applied to RUC Special Branch prior to 2000?
Let’s get it from the horse’s mouth. After my last blog was republished on a site called Expose the Republican Narrative a contributor , calling himself “Angus McTavish” offered a riposte.
I have found out who this person is, but I’m going to call him, for the purposes of debate “Jonty”.
Jonty has taken the time to offer rebuttal to most of my points, though he fails to recognise some tongue in cheek humour. But never mind.
He does , however , provide a window into the world of Special Branch, which he says he inhabited for a quarter of a century.
This is what he says about the rules.
4.5 – at the risk of repeating myself, De Silva seems to recognise a fact that has escaped the attention of both Nuala O’Loan and Michael Maguire, when they fail to recognise sufficiently, that intelligence agents, in order to operate as agents, must show support for the aims and objectives of their terrorist grouping. Furthermore, they must, if they are to be trusted within that group, carry out at least some actions which could be described as terrorist activity. Prior to RIPA (2000), this tactical imperative was conducted under the broad scope of agent handling tradecraft and regulated by the oversight of senior officers within RUCSB. It is recognised under RIPA (2000) as legal, justified and necessary deployment of CHIS/agents/touts, call them what you will. “
He goes on:
- Informers/handlers were allowed to commit crimes, including murder – “In the pursuance of a goal of public safety, agents were indeed permitted by handlers to support terrorist groups and even on occasions to engage in criminal activity on their behalf. This behaviour was neither a crime by the agent or the handler and was finally given legal protection in 2000 under RIPA. Murder was not permitted and despite the best investigative efforts of journalists galore, Human Rights organisations (both legitimate and utterly biased), the PONI and several historical inquiries and reviews, not one handler has indeed ever been prosecuted, which in itself provides strong evidence that the claims made both here and on a multitude of previous occasions, are baseless. Any evidence to the contrary, has yet to be uncovered and the mantra is wearing distinctly thin now.”
So let’s deal with Jonty’s argument. The agent must carry out “terrorist activity” and “even on occasions to engage in criminal activity on their behalf” in order to survive. “Murder was not permitted”, says Jonty. I wonder where that is in his rule book?
Prior to RIPA the United Kingdom’s Home Office guidelines on the use of informants was the only policy the Special Branch had to follow. The guidelines stated the police should never use an informant to encourage another to commit a crime; police officers should not counsel, incite, or procure the commission of a crime and protecting informants does not grant the informant immunity from arrest or prosecution for the crime they fully participate in.
Here is the full text. The typos and strange layout are original.
“Our rcfncncc: POL/ 69 1050/1/1
Horsefcrry House, Dean Ryie Street, London S.W.i
Telephone: 01-834 6655, ext.
12th May. L969
Dear Chief Constable,
HOME OFFICE CIRCULAR NO, 97/1969
Informants who take part in crime
The Home Secretary’s attention has been drawn to judicial comment in the appeal of Cork, Colman and Macro and to criticism of police action in several other cases involving police use of informants who took part in crime . He sought information about police practice from the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and through H.M. Inspectors of Constabulary. The Central Conference on 6th March gave an opportunity for a general discussion of practices and principles.
2* The Conference fully recognised that informants, properly employed, were
essential to criminal investigation and that, within limits, they ought to be protected. The risks attached to their employment were obvious, however, and safeguards were needed before use was made of an informant taking part in crime.
The Conference appreciated that circumstances varied so widely that it was difficult- to establish rules of general application; but the discussion
identified the principles listed in the next paragraph.
- The Conference in general agreed on the following points.
(a) No member of a police force, and no police informant, should counsel,
incite or procure the commission of a crime.
(b) Where an informant gives the police information about the intention of
others to commit a crime in which they intend that he shall play a part,
his participation should be allowed to continue only. where :-
(i) he does not actively engage in planning and committing the crime;
(ii) he is intended to play only a minor role; and
(iii) his participation is essential to enable the police to frustrate
the principal criminals and to arrest them (albeit for lesser offences
such as attempt or conspiracy to commit the crime, or carrying of
weapons) before injury is done to any person or serious damage to
The informant should always be instructed that he must on no account act
as agent provocateur , whether by suggesting to others that they should commit offences or encouraging them to do so, and that if he is found to have done so he will himself be liable to prosecution.
The Chi- f Constable
(c) The police must never commit themselves to a course which, whether to
protect an informant or otherwise, will constrain them to mislead a court
in any subsequent proceedings* This must always be regarded as a prime
consideration when deciding whether, and in what manner, an informant may be used and how far, if at all, he is to be allowed to take part in an offence.
If his use in the way envisaged will, or is likely to, result in its being
impossible to protect him without subsequently misleading the court, that must be regarded as a decisive reason for his not being so used or not being
(d) The need to protect an informant does not justify granting him immunity
from arrest or prosecution for the crime if he fully participates in it with the requisite intent (still less in respect of any other crime he has committed or may in future commit),
(e) The handling of informants calls for the judgment of an experienced
officer, there must be complete confidence and frankness between
supervising officers and subordinates, and every chief officer of police
should ensure effective supervision of his detectives; a decision to use a participating
informant should be taken at senior level.
(f) Payment to informants from public funds should be supervised by a
(g) Where an informant has been used who has taken part in the commission
of a crime for which others have been arrested, the prosecuting solicitor,
counsel, and (where he is concerned) the Director of Public Prosecutions
should be informed of the fact and of the part that the informant took in the commission of the offence, although, subject to (c) above, not
necessarily of his identity.
(h) Careful instruction should be given to detectives in training.
- The Home Secretary fully endorses these broad principles. He feels sure that
they are already widely applied in the police service; but in view of recent public
interest he thinks it right to bring them to the notice of all chief officers of police. He asks that you will find means of commending them to everyone who may be concerned in your force. He has instructed H.M. Inspectors of Constabulary to pay particular attention, in the course of their inspections, to the arrangements made in police forces for supervision and training in these matters.
Here is what Chief Constable George Hamilton said in a speech in may of this year:
“The problem was much bigger and more complex than the “few bad apples” analogy that has been articulated previously. In the absence of any regulatory framework for managing “agents” police officers were left to set their own standards, they were unaccountable to the law because there was no law. They were unaccountable to their fellow citizens. Policing was being done in a vacuum that allowed unregulated practice. Honest individuals were placed in impossible situations, having to choose between bad and worse. Many people lived; but some people also died as a result of that practice.
The environment in which they worked was chaotic – terrorist attacks were happening on a daily basis, and many lives were being lost. Investigations struggled to keep pace with the rate of murder and serious injury. The pressure was extreme. In these extraordinarily difficult and dangerous circumstances, the intent with which the vast majority of decisions were made was for the protection of the community. But they were, on many occasions, decisions and judgements that should not have been taken; and, I believe, would not have been taken if there had been a proper regulatory framework in place.
The RUC recognised the almost impossible situation they were in and the Da Silva Review makes reference to the fact that the RUC had asked Government for a framework, guidance or legislation on many occasions. Nothing was forthcoming.”
First, he is wrong and completely misleading to suggest there were no rules, secondly he appears to admit that agents were allowed to kill or be involved in killing.
Additionally, Northern Ireland had an interesting piece of legislation. The Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967, Section 5.
Penalties for concealing offences etc.
(b)that he has information which is likely to secure, or to be of material assistance in securing, the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of any person for that offence;
to give that information, within a reasonable time, to a constable and if, without reasonable excuse, he fails to do so he shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment according to the gravity of the offence about which he does not give that information, as follows:—
(i)if that offence is one for which the court is required by law to sentence an offender to death or to imprisonment for life or to detention during the pleasure of the Governor of Northern Ireland, he shall be liable to imprisonment for not more than ten years;
(ii)if it is one for which a person (of full age and capacity and not previously convicted) may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of fourteen years, he shall be liable to imprisonment for not more than seven years;
(iii)if it is not one included above but is one for which a person (of full age and capacity and not previously convicted) may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of ten years, he shall be liable to imprisonment for not more than five years;
(iv)in any other case, he shall be liable to imprisonment for not more than three years.
So Jonty is wrong in so many ways.
- There were rules
- The rules did not permit the carrying out of continuous crimes by agents
- Handlers broke the law if they turned a blind eye
- RIPA did not provide legal protection for criminality by agents
The awful truth is that Special Branch were told that the “ordinary” rules regarding informers or agents did not apply to them.
I’m sure Dear Reader , you will look forward to a cogent reply from Jonty, Dr William or Dr Tim or any other member of the RUC who claims to have been at the cutting edge of Special Branch.
Next up for the blog will be a demolition of George’s recent speech.
On 6th June 1990 there were, on conservative estimates ,100 RUC informers among the PIRA in Belfast.
Each had a team of handlers, probably four in number, to cover sickness, leave etc. Four hundred so far.
The handlers had bosses; sergeants, inspectors, chief inspectors, superintendents etc. Let’s estimate a further fifty senior officers.
Four hundred and fifty so far.
Then the meetings had to be covered by E4A and others, each one, day by day. Maybe another 100 officers , who would have seen the likes of Scappaticci, Sean Maguire, Brian Gillen etc “singing like canaries” in car parks in Hillsborough, Holywood , Helens Bay etc.
Five hundred and fifty.
The there was the “Hen House” where women, in serried ranks typed up the transcripts of the recordings of the meetings. Another fifty, at least.
Six hundred now.
Move to the civil servants in the NIO and others who read the ‘product’.
Then the Director of Public Prosecutions and his staff…
I’m rounding it up at seven hundred.
Maybe a third are dead.
But out there , today are several hundred people who could help the victims. They could tell the awful story of state involvement in supposedly terrorist murders.
Only a few have spoken out.
Why? Like the Cosa Nostra , the silent ones are motivated by money. Patten payments. Big pensions.
Before turning attention and criticism on the republicans, victims should ask themselves-why the silence? The answer is that the relevant RUC officers and civil servants are corrupt. Like the Mafia.
Who? Think of Flanagan, White, McQuillan , Matchett and Mains, all still earning from the misfortunes of the victims and failing to tell the truth.
This is the real tragedy of the Troubles.
In any other jurisdiction, there are cold case reviews on a regular basis. Even the PSNI is embracing this idea , with the recent activity over the death of Inga Maria Hauser, found dead in April 1988.
As someone said , recently, sad as it is, why her?
The answer of course is that the huge lump of Troubles deaths involve the state and the vast store of documents, implicating it. There are stores in Sprucefield, Seapark and Thiepval, where the army sits on a million copies. The state, in the form of Hamilton, Harris and the faceless people of MI5 will keep the lid on, as best they can.
All the citizen can do is keep probing.
What is additionally disappointing is that the new leaders appear to have gone to Spooks Academy.
Consider the letter written by the deputy director of the PPS in the case of Seamus Ludlow. His understanding of hearsay would shame a first year law student. How did he become deputy director and regurgitate all the lines of the state? Can you guess? Let’s hope he gets well spanked in the High Court.
As part of the week to mark twenty eight years since the murders of my parents, I am posting a secret document, giving an insight into how the state worked.
There will be other posts in this anniversary week.
Who is person K, referred to in the PONI report ?
His family live between Clough and Dundrum. He is related to Delbert Watson who was convicted of the murder of Jack Kielty in Dundrum in January 1988. Also convicted of that murder were David Curlett and William Bell, the driver of the getaway car. Doreen Watson, whose husband had been murdered by the IRA , sister of Delbert , was convicted of manslaughter.
K , according to Maguire, is a heavily traced terrorist. He has been linked to a conspiracy to murder Peter McCarthy and the attempted murder of John Henry Smyth. He is alleged to have been involved in the murder of Peter McCormack in Kilcoo on 19 November 1992.
Police told Maguire that he was part of a UVF unit.
Dear Reader, you might pause here to wonder, if the RUC Special Branch, inter alia , was involved in collusion with terrorists, why it would divulge this information to the PONI. I leave that with you.
K and others were identified by Special Branch to the Loughinisland MIT on the morning after the murders, as potential suspects.
K was arrested and interviewed several times on 18 July 1994. He provided an alibi for the time of the shootings. He said that he was in the Clough Inn with his girlfriend.
This alibi was not properly investigated, says Maguire . It is hard to see what the police could have done , two years later, to establish the truth of the alibi.
Maguire makes a mistake when he says at paragraph 7.169 that K’s hair sample was obtained and found to be a ‘microscopic match ‘ to a hair recovered from a holdall. The bag had not been found at this point.
The holdall was not found until 4 August 1994. A hair found therein was examined and K was arrested again on 22 August and the match was made. Caution should be exercised re hair matching after the FBI scandal regarding the science of hair matching.
However, police had a holdall in which they had found, inter alia, the hair and some overalls. The overalls showed a link with the seats of a Triumph Acclaim car found in a field and bearing a resemblance to the getaway car. Close by was found the VZ58 rifle which was the murder weapon. Fibres from the rifle matched fibres recovered from the Triumph Acclaim.
It is tolerably clear that the Acclaim was the getaway car.
Also, found on a roadway , was a blanket. It has not been properly examined.
I do not know if K has a criminal record, or other matters which might be used as bad character.
I do not know if the hair provided DNA evidence to link K to the bag.
In any event, it is hard to understand why K has not been charged in connection with the murders.
Maguire provides no explanation.
Additionally he makes no case that K was in any way protected, especially by Special Branch. If there was “collusion” as widely defined by Maguire , one might have expected Special Branch to have with held information in respect of K. Instead, the morning after the murders, they tell the MIT about K. K is , one might have thought, a prime suspect.
Maguire makes no criticism of the rigour of the initial investigation.
What is always absent from these reports is the general context.
Viewed as a homicide in leafy Surrey, I’m sure there are points to be made. Northern Ireland was a different environment, with the police overwhelmed by terrorist crime.
But the question remains.
Who is K and is he a State agent?
That, more than grandstanding by Maguire , would be a fact that the relatives of Loughinisland would prefer to know.
It is useful to set out the correspondence in extenso. [Lawyers love Latin, no more so than Lord Carswell, that Old Instonian, whose surprising expenses claims for attendance at the House of Lords were set out in extenso in the Sunday Times.]
But I digress.
Here is the correspondence.
What is surprising about this exchange , coming in late 1988, is the pessimism shown by Peter Bell.
Note his comment “there still remains too much adhoccery in the way Whitehall grips…the kind of problem which IRA terrorism is likely to present us with over the coming months”.
Ivor Roberts has no firm proposals, in reply, except for a jolly good lunch. [Your club or mine?]
The exchange does not sit well with the analysis by those who say that by this point PIRA was heavily infiltrated and was being paralysed.
It does, however , point to the likelihood that each of the agencies, RUC , Box and Army , were very much doing their own thing with informers. That leads on to the question whether or not the RUC, with a duty to preserve life, could ever have known if informers to the Army and Box were participating in murder.
Re the Boyd Group, TOP [I] and the Assessment Staff Machinery, that is all for another day, Dear Reader.
In December 1988, a telex was sent to Our Man in Brussels.
The subject was Danny Morrison. It was a briefing for the Ambassador.
The writer invited the Ambassador to “draw on the following background on Danny”….
It contained the following information.
“Morrison was interned between 27 November 1972 and 21 December 1973,..he was editor of An Phoblacht [Republican News] in the late 1970s [mouthpiece for IRA and Sinn Fein]…currently director of publicity for Sinn Fein-postion held since early 80s…member of Art Comhairle [Sinn Fein National Executive] for several years…in 1981 he made the infamous quote ballot box /armalite unquote speech at the Ard Fheis [Sinn Fein Annual Conference]…in January 1982 was charged with entering the US illegally and deported to Canada….known to be a quote hawk unquote rather than a quote dove unquote….involved in recent talks with SDLP …vigourous in defending ‘armed struggle’ and publicly dismissing talk of a ceasefire….”
The author went on “You may also say unattributably that we have good reason to believe that Morrison is heavily involved in a central position on the military side of Sinn Fein’s activities”
In January 1990 Morrison was arrested near a house where Sandy Lynch [Special Branch informer] had been interrogated by Sean Maguire [state informer] and Freddie Scappaticci [state informer].
Morrison’s arrest and subsequent wrongful conviction got him off the streets and away from the centre of power. Was that because he was a “hawk”? If so , “cui bono?” The British? The Sinn Fein/PIRA doves? The “Peace Process”?
Answers on a postcard, Dear Reader.
Oh! I almost forgot. The author of the telex?