ruc

Money talks

It’s twenty years since I first took active steps to try and find the killers of my parents.

A Crown prosecutor for many years, it was slowly dawning on me that what I had been told, professionally, was not what it seemed in many cases.

I started gently, asking for an update on the killings, which had happened twelve years earlier. It might surprise the reader to know that in those twelve years , not one officer in charge had ever contacted me with an update.

My first enquiries were met with the usual obfuscation and it took many months before I had an intelligent response.

That was to tell me almost nothing. 

Where was the file? Well, it was clear that it had been put away many years before and no detective  had given it a second thought in those years.

What followed was a succession of promises from lots of senior officers who , shortly afterwards retired.

I will not trouble you Dear Reader, with the HET or the Police Ombudsman, because my target is elsewhere.

Follow the money

The Patten payment scheme, ostensibly designed to remove sufficient officers to achieve some parity of religious breakdown in the police, was a bonanza to members of the RUC.

A fifty year old superintendent with thirty years enhanced pensionable service could expect a lump sum of £300,000 and an annual pension of £27,000.

A constable in similar circumstances could expect a lump sum of £134,000 and an annual sum of £13,000.

There were other benefits too. Money to train to be a mountain guide in the Mournes, for example.

Four thousand officers took the Patten offer.

Then there were revised injury on duty schemes.

Then there was a hearing loss scheme.

All-in-all the State paid out more than half a billion pounds to ex-RUC officers.

What did it get in return?

The absolute unwavering silence of every member of the RUC about any information relating to wrongdoing by its members, even if it resulted in the death of a colleague.

For the State, the mirror image is the menu of on-the-runs, Royal Pardons and huge sums paid to SFIRA.

In the last twenty years a number of police officers, known to me personally, and for whom, on occasions I had given advice, pro bono; could have given me information, evidence, a hint, a ‘steer’ or a nod, about the circumstances of the killing of one of their own [and his wife].

Apart from one seriously unwell detective, not one of these heroes opened their mouths. 

Let me give you an example, Dear Reader.

Alan Simpson was the senior CID officer in D Division on the day of the bomb, 6th June 1990. I met him, I think , that day or the next. I certainly met him at the inquests, because he was managing them.

Years on, an intermediary, who I had helped, suggested that Simpson might be willing to meet me and  discuss the case. A date was set , I awaited his arrival but was told instead that he was too ill to meet me.

I suggested that, if I could communicate by email, that would suffice.

He provided his email.

I wrote to him.

On 7/23/20, peter sefton  wrote:

“Alan

Thank you for providing your email address.
My parents were murdered by PIRA by a PIRA ucbt on the Ballygomartin Road on
the morning of 6 June 1990.
I think that you were in Tennent St at the time, in charge of CID.
I seem to recall that we met, once at least, at the inquest.
On the day of their deaths or the next day, I was in Tennent St and I was
taken to a room and shown a wall display of the suspected bomb team,
including their photographs. I believe one may have been a woman and another
was a Finucane.
I have been campaigning for justice for them, actively, since 2002 and very
pro-actively , since 2014.
I know that a person called Braniff was arrested and questioned shortly
after the deaths but was released without charge.
My question is :
As CID commander, did you receive intel from the Branch or any other entity,
including a CHIS , as to the identity of the culprits? Were any suspects
protected by the Branch, FRU/Army or MI5?
My hypothesis is that PIRA were so infiltrated by the State that, even if
advance knowledge was not available [though I have reservations about that
scenario] identities would have been ascertained in the aftermath. So it is
a matter of great distress to me that no prosecution ensued.
Time for me is short and I would like to unlock this case sooner rather than
later.

Regards

Peter Sefton”

Within 24 hours he replied:

“Hello Peter,

Thank you for your email.

My desk is almost clear now and I will be in touch probably over the weekend.

Best…..

Alan.”

He never did reply. Big desk. 

My intermediary was apologetic but assured me that Simpson was ‘very unwell’.

I heard no more from Simpson but was mildly interested that he wrote to the Times on the deaths of Lords Hutton and Kerr, suggesting that he had met them in the course of his duties. Then he published an article in the Belfast Telegraph on 19th January this year. I don’t subscribe to this rag and the article, behind the paywall began:

Colleagues  fed me a false line on Finucane killing writes Alan Simpson 

“As a former RUC CID Detective Superintendent, I was greatly disappointed, but not surprised, at the Police Ombudsman’s recent finding that there had been “collusive behaviours” by elements of Special Branch when dealing with UDA killer gangs in the north-west of the province.”

Perhaps  he has a ghost writer or he has risen Lazarus- like from his bed or perhaps his solicitor , Kevin Winters, has inspired him to write about Finucane but not Jimmy Sefton.

Let me be clear, in the course of my career I met many brave, devoted and honest police officers.

I also met rogues, cowards and liars, the latter too often in the course of a trial.

My observations are directed at those whose  help I have sought, directly or indirectly, who have been motivated by one thing.

Money

I could name these men. But, aside from the most egregious,  Alan Simpson, I won’t.

What lesson can we learn?

The State has bought their compliance and silence.

The operation to kill Jimmy Sefton, happily retired but not on Patten, aged 65 and by implication, his wife, wasn’t sketched out on the back of a fag packet. It was scouted, planned , approved at the highest levels in PIRA. It is inconceivable that informers, agents, touts, whatever you want to call them, were not involved. It is inconceivable that Special Branch did not have information and that some or all of that was not shared with CID. 

Without exaggeration, it is likely that a dozen RUC officers have information that would be useful to their case. 

The same silence operated against my parents is practised when investigations into other killings are carried out by other bodies. 

Some of these culprits think nothing of instructing solicitors on their own behalf and for their own cases  who are , shall we say, critical of the State.

This blog is written more in sorrow than in anger. I saw enough  in my time of corruption at the highest levels of the RUC. Often it was at the expense of their junior colleagues and of justice; but killing is in another realm.

The fact remains that “one of their own” will receive no justice because money talks.

Many of the men of whom I speak profess Christianity.

Proverbs 11:4

A Protestant wind

Since my retirement from the Bar and my ensuing freedom to say what I choose, without the republicans and their fellow travellers in Chichester Street having a go at me, I have pursued the killers of my parents and supported others who have lost loved ones.

Readers of this blog will know that I allege that the State had an involvement in my parents’  murders.

One of our early successes related to  the killing of John Bingham. Bingham was reportedly a loyalist commander. The circumstances of his murder cried out for a proper investigation. One that the RUC did not provide.

When the question ‘why?’ is posed, the State falls silent.

As a result of dogged work by others, Operation Kenova has now sent a file on this murder to the PPS.

Our allegation was that the killing was carried out by republicans, some or all of whom were State agents. We further alleged that the State covered up the circumstances of the killing.

The matter is now the subject of a file within the PPS. State sponsored killings are particularly repulsive and  formerly have been regarded as the province of South American dictators.

But there are more worrying aspects. And we should not rest on our laurels.

Three lawyers, employees and agents of the Crown,  have been reported for prosecution for perjury. You can read more about this in the Guardian and two articles written by Henry McDonald.

This must cause concern about the probity of any case in which these lawyers had an input.

Jon Boutcher has often , to me and to others, used the phrase ‘boiling the sea’.

By this I understand him to mean that the extent of alleged State involvement in crime during the Troubles is massive.

Boutcher has presented the PPS, [within whose walls some alleged criminals may reside, or at one time may have resided] with a small number of files.

If he has information that the nexus between terrorists and the State goes much further, his duty is to present that evidence to the Chief Constable and his duty is to conduct further investigations.

BBC Spotlight has brought into the public domain some of the material that many of us have known about for many years.

The republican movement, SFIRA, the Finucane Centre, Relatives for Justice, Sean Murray , Trevor Birney and his republican mate, are all silent.

But there is a bigger picture. James Sefton was targeted and killed by republicans for reasons other than his service with the RUC. By 1990 PIRA was not only riddled with agents and informers but also well surveilled by hardware.

This took the form of cameras, listening devices, satellites, computers and other technology  still in use in updated formats all over the world. The State knows precisely who killed him and my mother. It hold this information secretly, guarded by the spooks and probably corrupt lawyers and police officers.

Now the door is ajar. Let’s kick it down. The roll call of senior  republican figures is , at least:

Adams

McGuinness

Bobby Storey

Spike Murray [father of Sean Murray, the ‘film maker’]

Brian Gillen

Sean Maguire

They were employed  by the State and were participating informants in murders and other serious crimes relating to police officers, politicians and other innocent civilians.

The phrase “Protestant Wind”  refers to the storm that scattered the Spanish Armada and  the wind that propelled William of Orange to Torbay.

It is now starting to cleanse Northern Ireland of the canker of State murder of its own citizens

Readers may have read , already, my last blog about Alan Mains. He was the subject of a gushing Belfast Telegraph article, describing him as “flying high in the world of private business”. He is nothing of the sort , of course. Read my tweets for a blow by blow demolition of his claims of directorships. SecuriGroup , when I contacted them, refused to describe his role-it is certainly not as a director in any shape or form. He was never a director of Ultimate Leisure or any of Bob Senior’s companies. He does have a company called A and A Security, of which he is the sole director. It was formed in 2019. He was probably Robinson’s minder at some point. He had a relationship with Paddy Kearney. No mention of it in the Belfast Telegraph article. Have they parted company? Why does this matter? Mains claims to have been in RUC Special Branch. Informed commentators are sceptical of this. Even if he was , or was controlled by MI5, I had lunch with him a few years ago. I asked him about this scenario. “A handler is informed by his high level tout that a RUC officer is the target for an under car bomb. If the operation is foiled, the high level tout, who provides quality intel on PIRA , will be compromised and likely killed. What should the State do?” I posited that the routine solution was to let the officer be killed. Mains looked me in the eye and said that that never happened. Dear Reader, you decide….

Smithwick and Mains- a taster

The Belfast Telegraph has published a gushing article about Alan Mains.  What it does not mention is his controversial evidence at the Smithwick Inquiry. This investigated the murders of Breen and Buchanan by PIRA.

It has never been clear why Mains did not accompany his friend and boss , Breen to Dundalk.

Three possibilities immediately present themselves:

  1. He was never tasked to go.
  2. He asked Breen might he have time off to play rugby.
  3. He wanted to go to the gym.

Readers need to study the report to decide which, if any of these is the truth. The rugby one is repeated in the Belfast Telegraph article.

Jamie Bryson wrote about Mains in his  book , Three Headed Dog. He alleged that Mains worked for MI5. He was Kevin Fulton’s handler, inter alia.

Mains never sued.

Most RUC officers I have spoken to regard Mains as a fantasist, claiming to have been here and there, without cause.

He went so far to tell me that he had been at the scene of my parents’ murders, yet nobody I have spoken to recalls him being there or why he would have had any need to be there. There is no evidence in the papers I have seen , of his presence.

His rise to stardom was connected to his friendship with Ronnie Flanagan, that bibulous womaniser, who did the bidding of the British state in rebranding the RUC.

Anyway, don’t take my word for it, read Smithwick.

So Dear Belfast Telegraph, next time you want to eulogise someone like Mains, do you homework.

Here is the extract.

“6.1.16 Mr Mains gave evidence over the course of two days and was robustly cross – examined by both counsel for the Garda Commissioner and counsel for Mr Owen Corrigan. It is fair to say that one of the central points of their cross – examination is that Mr Mains’ original statement of 22nd March 1989 appears inconsistent with his evidence about:

(i) Chief Superintendent Breen asking Mr Mains him to accompany him to Dundalk;

(ii) his being asked to phone Bob Buchanan to see if Superintendent Buchanan was available to go to Dundalk; and

(iii) his making a telephone call to the Dundalk Garda Station on Chief Superintendent Breen’s behalf to arrange the meeting.

It was, in essence, suggested that Mr Mains’ written statement of 22nd March 1989 does not support his evidence in relation to these three aspects and therefore affects his overall credibility as a witness.

6.1.17 It is the case that the following part of Mr Mains’s statement does not sit easily with his evidence in relation to his role in setting up the meeting in Dundalk:

“He [Chief Superintendent Breen] informed me that he had to attend a meeting in Dundalk that afternoon with the Border Superintendent, Superintendent Buchanan, along with Chief Superintendent Nolan, Garda.”

 

6.1.24 “I would add that it appears from all of the evidence before me that neither the statement which Mr Mains did provide in 1989 – which refers to Harry Breen’s concerns about unnamed members of An Garda Síochána – nor the further specific information in relation to Owen Corrigan which I find as a fact Mr Mains did share with the senior officers, was communicated to An Garda Síochána. I find this extremely surprising. In the immediate aftermath of the killings of two of the most senior RUC officers to be murdered in the Troubles, the RUC was informed that one of them, only hours before is death, had expressed concerns about a Garda officer being in the pay of ‘Slab’ Murphy. It seems incomprehensible to me why the RUC did not immediately raise that matter with An Garda Síochána. The likeliest explanation that one can find on the evidence is Mr Mains’ account of what Sir John Hermon said to him in Newry on 21st March 1989, namely that Owen Corrigan had already been investigated and had been cleared. Yet both the Police Service of Northern Ireland and An Garda Síochána have indicated to the Tribunal that there is no documentation to support the suggestion that such an investigation in relation to Detective Sergeant Corrigan was carried out. I am therefore compelled to the view that the information ought to have been, but was not, shared with the Gardaí, and no reasonable explanation for this failure can be discerned.”

It should also be pointed out that no RUC officer , called to give evidence at Smithwick, remembered Mains’s  alleged meeting with the Chief Constable.

 

 

 

 

Irish Times article re Enniskillen

Irish Times article

 

 

I set out below an article written by Ed Moloney, who needs no introduction to scholars of the history of the Troubles.

 

Whether or not the letter is genuine, it raises, again, the question of the participation of State forces in the activities of PIRA.

 

Supporters of the Republican cause, including many lawyers, describe this as “collusion”.

 

It has been noticeable, in the articles written for the Newsletter , that not one participant has touched on this issue.

 

Instead it rolled out the usual State actors , like Collins and Matchett.

 

Equally, I am not aware of any “victims’” organisation exploring this issue at all.

 

The explanation, partly, may be the placing of ex State actors within these organisations. Take SEFF, it employs Peter Murtagh, ex State Spook. I’ve listened to SEFF’s pitch for victims and nowhere in it does it even acknowledge the possibility that State actors were involved with PIRA. The focus is mainly on PIRA killings of the security forces.

 

As always, Dear Reader, I urge you to judge for yourself.

 

Did MI5 Or The IRA Kill The Enniskillen Dead? The Evidence May Be In A Letter We Cannot See

by The Broken Elbow

Sometimes, I just despair of The Irish Times. 

There are times when it is not just essential to publish all the evidence behind a story but actually obligatory. And not to do so is a journalistic sin beyond comprehension.

In to-day’s edition of the Times, there appears a story which qualifies sans pareil for the above injunction.

The story deals with a letter purportedly written in mid-November 1987 by an MI5 officer working in Northern Ireland and addressed to Brian Lenihan, the then Foreign Affairs minister in Dublin, which claims that British intelligence knew in advance about the IRA’s plan to bomb the Enniskillen cenotaph in November 1987 but did nothing to stop it because it would create ‘a massive backlash’ against the IRA.

Civilians flee the scene of the Enniskillen cenotaph bombing

In fact a careful reading of the story about the letter suggests that not only did MI5 do nothing to stop the bombing but, according to the letter’s anonymous author, the spy agency actually manipulated the bomb’s timing mechanism so that it would cause the maximum damage to the IRA, i.e. kill the most civilians.

In other words, MI5 may have actually murdered the twelve civilians, not the IRA – although the IRA made it all possible.

The Times quotes the alleged agent as writing:

“Our section decided to change the timing device and let the explosion take place so that the IRA would score an own goal and create a massive backlash against itself,” he wrote.

“Our section also calculated that in the climate of a backlash against the IRA all kinds of security measures could be implemented including extradition.”

“If I had more courage I would come out openly and prove with more what I am now saying,” he wrote.

The Enniskillen bomb killed twelve people and dozens more were injured, some horribly, when they were engulfed in rubble. The backlash against the IRA was indeed considerable and arguably intensified a debate about strategy between the military and political wings of the Provos which ultimately took shape in the first IRA ceasefire of the peace process six years later.

The author of the letter describes him or herself as someone who had been working for  MI5 in the North for eighteen months or so in a section of the intelligence agency which specialised in infiltrating paramilitary groups.

He was so scared, he wrote, that he crossed the Border to post the letter, which has now been released as part the 1988 tranche of government papers eligible for publication.

There is no way of knowing whether this story is true or someone’s sick fantasy, or if the author of the letter was a real MI5 agent or the product of someone’s overactive imagination.

But it is surely not without significance that the Department of Foreign Affairs considered the letter important enough to preserve in the files and now to make public in the annual festival of governmental openness.

The Irish Times‘ readership, especially those who follow the newspaper on the internet, might be helped in their efforts to discern the truth, if they could actually see and read the letter, as The Irish Times‘ journalist who wrote the story evidently did.

In this day and age of iPhone and iPads capable of taking photos anywhere, and the ease with which the products can then be displayed on the internet, surely the paper’s readers should have been allowed that basic right?

Here is the Times‘ story in full:

The Broken Elbow | December 30, 2018 at 4:02 pm | Categories: Uncategorized | URL: https://wp.me/p1iwpM-3hw

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The uncontrolled and unaccountable RUC Special Branch

      

In this blog I contend that the available evidence supports the argument that the RUC Special Branch operated without any legal constraints and was indeed a ‘force within a force’. The effect of this was as touched on, somewhat gingerly by the Chief Constable, in a recent speech. He  said this:

 

“The problem was much bigger and more complex than the “few bad apples” analogy that has been articulated previously. In the absence of any regulatory framework for managing “agents” police officers were left to set their own standards, they were unaccountable to the law because there was no law. They were unaccountable to their fellow citizens. Policing was being done in a vacuum that allowed unregulated practice. Honest individuals were placed in impossible situations, having to choose between bad and worse. Many people lived; but some people also died as a result of that practice.

The environment in which they worked was chaotic – terrorist attacks were happening on a daily basis, and many lives were being lost. Investigations struggled to keep pace with the rate of murder and serious injury.  The pressure was extreme. In these extraordinarily difficult and dangerous circumstances, the intent with which the vast majority of decisions were made was for the protection of the community. But they were, on many occasions, decisions and judgements that should not have been taken; and, I believe, would not have been taken if there had been a proper regulatory framework in place.

The RUC recognised the almost impossible situation they were in and the Da Silva Review makes reference to the fact that the RUC had asked Government for a framework, guidance or legislation on many occasions. Nothing was forthcoming.”

 

 

 

Let’s parse that:

  • Police officers managed agents
  • There was no regulatory framework
  • Officers set their own standards
  • They were unaccountable to the law
  • There was no law
  • Policing was being done in a vacuum
  • There was unregulated practice
  • The RUC had asked the Government for a framework, guidance or legislation on many occasions

 

 

Many police officers managed agents. Those in CID were regulated by the use of the Home Office guidelines.

 

Here they are. There was a later, almost identical version.

 

Our rcfncncc: POL/ 69 1050/1/1

Four rtftrtnct:

 

 

 

HOME OFFICE

Horsefcrry House, Dean Ryie Street, London S.W.i

Telex: 24986

Telephone: 01-834 6655, ext.

 

12th May. L969

 

 

 

Dear Chief Constable,

 

HOME OFFICE CIRCULAR NO, 97/1969

Informants who take part in crime

 

The Home Secretary’s attention has been drawn to judicial comment in the appeal of Cork, Colman and Macro and to criticism of police action in several other cases involving police use of informants who took part in crime . He sought information about police practice from the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and through H.M. Inspectors of Constabulary. The Central Conference on 6th March gave an opportunity for a general discussion of practices and principles.

 

2* The Conference fully recognised that informants, properly employed, were

essential to criminal investigation and that, within limits, they ought to be protected. The risks attached to their employment were obvious, however, and safeguards were needed before use was made of an informant taking part in crime.

The Conference appreciated that circumstances varied so widely that it was difficult- to establish rules of general application; but the discussion

identified the principles listed in the next paragraph.

 

  1. The Conference in general agreed on the following points.

 

(a) No member of a police force, and no police informant, should counsel,

incite or procure the commission of a crime.

 

(b) Where an informant gives the police information about the intention of

others to commit a crime in which they intend that he shall play a part,

his participation should be allowed to continue only. where :-

 

(i) he does not actively engage in planning and committing the crime;

 

(ii) he is intended to play only a minor role; and

 

(iii) his participation is essential to enable the police to frustrate

the principal criminals and to arrest them (albeit for lesser offences

such as attempt or conspiracy to commit the crime, or carrying of

weapons) before injury is done to any person or serious damage to

property.

 

The informant should always be instructed that he must on no account act

as agent provocateur , whether by suggesting to others that they should commit offences or encouraging them to do so, and that if he is found to have done so he will himself be liable to prosecution.

 

 

 

Ac) ,

 

The Chi- f Constable

 

 

 

(c) The police must never commit themselves to a course which, whether to

protect an informant or otherwise, will constrain them to mislead a court

in any subsequent proceedings* This must always be regarded as a prime

consideration when deciding whether, and in what manner, an informant may be used and how far, if at all, he is to be allowed to take part in an offence.

If his use in the way envisaged will, or is likely to, result in its being

impossible to protect him without subsequently misleading the court, that must be regarded as a decisive reason for his not being so used or not being

protected.

 

(d) The need to protect an informant does not justify granting him immunity

from arrest or prosecution for the crime if he fully participates in it    with the requisite intent (still less in respect of any other crime he has committed or may in future commit),

 

(e) The handling of informants calls for the judgment of an experienced

officer, there must be complete confidence and frankness between

supervising officers and subordinates, and every chief officer of police

should ensure effective supervision of his detectives; a decision to use a participating

informant should be taken at senior level.

 

(f) Payment to informants from public funds should be supervised by a

Senior officer.

 

(g) Where an informant has been used who has taken part in the commission

of a crime for which others have been arrested, the prosecuting solicitor,

counsel, and (where he is concerned) the Director of Public Prosecutions

should be informed of the fact and of the part that the informant took in the commission of the offence, although, subject to (c) above, not

necessarily of his identity.

 

(h) Careful instruction should be given to detectives in training.

 

  1. The Home Secretary fully endorses these broad principles. He feels sure that

they are already widely applied in the police service; but in view of recent public

interest he thinks it right to bring them to the notice of all chief officers of police. He asks that you will find means of commending them to everyone who may be concerned in your force. He has instructed H.M. Inspectors of Constabulary to pay particular attention, in the course of their inspections, to the arrangements made in police forces for supervision and training in these matters.

 

Yours sincerely,

 

 

 

 

The clue is in the title “informants who take part in crime”

 

Participating informants are a necessary evil. There is no point in having an informant who has the occasional drink with the targets. He has to be in the thick of things. His intelligence is vital in identifying the main criminals. But the handling of a participating informant has to comply with the Rule of Law. It matters not whether the crime is burglary or murder. The law does not distinguish between ‘ordinary crime’ and ‘terrorist crime’.

 

My contention is that the Home Office Guidelines were perfectly appropriate.

 

What do others say?

 

 

The Police Ombudsman said as follows in her report [Operation Ballast]  into the activities of the Special Branch.

“It is accepted by the Police Ombudsman that intelligence, in itself, is not evidence. However it may be possible to derive investigative opportunities from intelligence. There were mechanisms which were used by other police forces within the United Kingdom to prevent the failings of informant and intelligence handling identified in this Report. Those mechanisms should have involved clear and effective policies for informant handling, combined with regular training and effective intrusive management.

  1. Although such systems were used, to some extent, by RUC CID, they were not used by Special Branch. In 1997 the RUC introduced new rules for informant handling and management. A decision was made by Chief Officers that those rules should not apply to Special Branch. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act in 2000 imposed statutory rules about the review, management, assessment and cancellation of informants. The Surveillance Commissioner found, following the referral of the matter by the Police Ombudsman, that those rules had not been complied with in the case of Informant 1, and that there had been a failure to meet National Minimum Standards and to take into account intelligence about Informant 1’s own criminal conduct.

Comment: even after the enactment of RIPA police officers were still not complying with the rules. This gives the lie to ‘Jonty’s’ assertion that what SB did during the Troubles was vindicated by RIPA.

  1. 31.3  Informant handling is a sensitive and important task. Mechanisms did exist and were used by police forces in the rest of the United Kingdom (These were known as the Home Office Guidelines). They were not specifically designed for the purpose of terrorist informants. Nevertheless they would have provided a structure within which there would have been regular assessment of informants, clearly defined and auditable processes for intelligence handling, annual reviews of their contribution and situation, and control over any notified future occasions on which an informant was permitted to engage in crime.

Comment: O’Loan makes the assertion that the rules were not specifically designed for “terrorist informants”. Nowhere does she justify that.

This was the process known as “participating informants,” through which informants could be authorised, within defined limits, to engage in crime.

  1. 31.4  This system was used by RUC/PSNI CID, to some extent, prior to 2000.
  2. 31.5  The rules for participating informants were as follows:
    1. the police must never use an informant to encourage another person to commit a criminal offence;
    2. the police should not mislead a court about an informant’s role in the commission of a criminal offence, particularly where the informant had more than a minor role in the criminal act;
    3. No member of a police force, and no police informant, should counsel, incite or procure the commission of a crime;
    4. Where an informant gives the police information about the intention of others to commit a crime in which they intend that he shall play a part, his participation should be allowed to continue only where:
  1. He does not actively engage in planning and committing the crime;
  2. He is intended to play only a minor role; and

iii. His participation is essential to enable the police to frustrate the principal criminals and to arrest them, (albeit for lesser offences such as attempt or conspiracy to commit the crime, or carrying offensive weapons) before injury is done to any person or serious damage to property.

  1. The need to protect an informant does not justify granting him immunity from arrest or prosecution for the crime if he fully participates;
  2. Where an informant has been used, who has taken part in the commission of a crime for which others have been arrested, the prosecuting solicitor, counsel, and (where he is concerned) the Director of Public Prosecutions should be informed of the fact and of the part that the informant took in the commission of the offence, although, not necessarily of his identity.
  1. 31.6  These rules were not applied by RUC Special Branch. Officers have stated that in the context of terrorism, they were “unworkable”. Attempts were made in the early 1990s to devise a satisfactory system, and approaches were made to Government for the adoption of a more flexible approach to terrorist informant handling. Government did not respond positively to those approaches.
  2. 31.7  The Police Ombudsman has not been provided by the PSNI with any documentation which would indicate that any Special Branch informant whose activities were examined during this investigation, were given participating informant status by the RUC or PSNI for any of the crimes the investigators have examined. These include the suspected crimes of membership of a proscribed organisation and directing terrorism. Over the years informants were allegedly involved in a number of intelligence led operations managed by senior officers, in relation to situations in which the informants allegedly committed offences such as hijacking, unlawful imprisonment, possession of firearms and of explosives. For all of these offences there is no record of Participating Informant status being granted.
  1. 31.8  The Assistant Chief Constable Crime Department has told the Police Ombudsman that a system for the authorisation of participating informants was developed by the RUC for Special Branch in 2001.

Comment: if this was the first system for the authorisation of participating informants it proves that SB were indeed a ‘force within a force’, seemingly unaccountable

  1. 31.9  When information was received, Special Branch officers determined what intelligence should be disseminated to CID or Uniform police on a day-to-day basis. When there had been a terrorist murder, it was the responsibility of local Special Branch officers to liaise with the CID investigation team, to provide them with relevant information which could assist their enquiries. The Police Ombudsman has seen intelligence, which should have been passed to CID officers investigating murders, which was deliberately not passed to them, and was marked “No Downward Dissemination”.
  2. 31.10  When it became necessary to arrest or charge an informant the Walker Report provided that this should only be done in the case of “planned arrests”. In accordance with the following rules; it must be

“cleared with Regional Special Branch to ensure that no agents of either RUC or Army are involved. A decision to arrest an agent must only be taken after discussion between Special Branch and CID. If agreement is not possible the matter will be referred to Assistant Chief Constable level. The charging of an agent must be the result of a conscious decision by both Special Branch and CID in which the balance of advantage has been carefully weighed.”

  1. 31.11  RUC rules provided also that :
    1. Police officers should record as much intelligence as possible on official documentation since intelligence ‘held in an officer’s memory’ was unlikely to be properly exploited;
    2. Until 1995, CID “agents”who were members of “subversive organisations” should be handed over to Special Branch or, where this was not possible, they should be jointly handled by Special Branch and CID.
    3. Special Branch had primacy over CID in terms of joint handling of paramilitary informants, until 1995 when CID officers ceased to handle paramilitary informants.
    4. Officers should assess the continued employment of their sources in the light of the information available at the time.
  2. 31.12  In 1997 the RUC adopted new rules for the “Management and Use of Informants,” modelled on rules produced by the Association of Chief Police Officers [ACPO] in 1995. A former Assistant Chief Constable told the Police Ombudsman in 2003 that Chief Officers of the RUC made a decision, in 1997, that Special Branch should be excluded from the operation of these rules. In 1998 a document was produced for the Patten Independent Commission on Policing, stating that all the rules did apply to Special Branch. This clearly was not the case. The evidence from officers is that there was no change in Special Branch practice until 2000.
  3. 31.13  On 25 September 2000, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 [RIPA] came into effect. Under the Act informants are referred to as “Covert Human Intelligence Sources” [CHIS]. In August 2002 a

 “Covert Human Intelligence Sources: Code of Practice”, came into force in accordance with the Act.

31.14 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act also established the Office of the Surveillance Commissioners. Amongst the responsibilities of the Surveillance Commissioners is the review of the practices and procedures used, and the records kept in connection with the authorisations, review, cancellation and risk assessment of CHIS.

 

 

Here are extracts from the de Silva report into the murder of Pat Finucane

 

 

Guidance applicable to the Royal Ulster Constabulary

4.15 The only guidance in place relating to the use of informants by the police at

the time of Patrick Finucane’s murder was contained in a Home Office Circular,

the ‘Consolidated Circular to the Police on Crime and Kindred Matters’9 (‘the

Guidelines’). Although the Guidelines were issued in 1986, they were essentially

unchanged from previous guidance first issued in 1969.10 However, the RUC did

not apply either circular in Northern Ireland as they regarded them as inadequate

for dealing with terrorist-related crime.

 

 

Comment: This is incorrect. The guidelines were applied to the CID. De Silva contradicts himself later. Also, he appears not to have enquired as to the practical or legal objections to the application of the guidelines to the RUC.

 

4.16 A letter dated 21 January 1987 from the RUC to the Northern Ireland Office

(NIO) summarised the position as follows:

“[The Guidelines] take no cognizance at all of the special problems relating

to Northern Ireland. They were, of course, drawn up to deal with ‘ordinary’

criminals in a mainland context, rather than for coping with terrorists.

Given our special situation the restrictions placed upon us by virtue of the

guidelines are unrealistic if we are to continue paramilitary penetration/

source protection.”11

 

 

Comment: What is the ‘special situation’- how does a ‘civilian’ murder differ from a ‘terrorist’ one?

 

4.17 A paper subsequently prepared by the RUC for submission to the NIO in February

1988 set out a detailed analysis of the position, which they summarised as

follows:

“At present Special Branch in common with other branches throughout

the United Kingdom, has available to it only one set of guidelines upon

which to base its information gathering procedures and to conduct reactive

operations based on the information received. Those guidelines are set out

in the Home Office Consolidated Circular on Crime Kindred (sic) Matters.

They were originally drafted in 1969. In essence the guidelines seek to set

parameters within which the police can determine the degree and extent to

which informants are to be used in the investigation and detection of crime

and the prosecution of criminals before the courts.

By and large they have been successful in this respect and they continue to

meet the needs of the police in dealing with ordinary crime as no apparent

difficulty is experienced in adhering to the principles expressed therein.

However, major problems do arise when it comes to the application of the

guidelines to the terrorist scene, for here it rapidly becomes apparent that

strict adherence to the guidelines would result in a far from comprehensive

or effective intelligence network ever being recognised.” 12

9 Home Office Circular 35/1986

10 Home Office Circular Informants who Take Part in Crime, 97/1969

11 Letter from the RUC to the NIO, 21 January 1987

12 RUC commentary on the Home Office Guidelines on the Use of Informants, 11 February

 

Comment: Now the RUC are admitting that the guidelines should apply to their Special Branch, the same as all other UK SBs. But there are again “unspecified difficulties”.

 

 

4.40 A later submission to the Minister of State at the NIO, John Stanley MP, on

24 February 1988 attached a paper received from the RUC. As was noted in

the covering minute, “[i]t leans rather more towards an analysis of the admitted

problems than towards actual proposals”.33

4.41 The RUC’s submission noted that the Stalker Report had accepted “the

limitations of the Home Office Guidelines on the use of informants in Northern

Ireland ”34 and that the McLachlan Report had found that those Guidelines “must

be regarded as obstructive and confusing in the dangerous task of defeating

terrorism”.35 A detailed background paper by Assistant Chief Constable (ACC)

Monahan analysed “the gap between the demands placed on the intelligence

sector and its legal capacity to achieve its objectives”.36

 

Comment: It is not known what arguments Monahan made in this paper.

 

On 3 March 1988 the NIO wrote to the Home Office on the subject of the

Guidelines, noting that:

“… the Stalker/Sampson enquiry raised the question of the guidelines for

the police in dealing with informants in terrorist cases. The subject was

subsequently dealt with in some detail in the report of Mr Charles McLachlan,

a member of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary [HMIC], on his

special investigation of the RUC. The general thrust of the comments is that

the existing Home Office Guidelines on Informants are not appropriate to

police forces, particularly the RUC, in their counter terrorist operations.” 38

 

Comment: It is not known what comments McLachlan  made on this subject.

 

Information I have received from the Security Service indicates that the issue

was a topic of informal discussion for some months between the Attorney

General and the Security Service’s Legal Adviser. In a note dated 28 April 1989

recommending that the Home Office Guidelines be amended “to allow effective

but properly supervised use of agents in countering terrorism”, the Legal Adviser

summarised the problem as follows:

“… it can be argued that the Home Office Guidelines are undermined because,

in order to run a terrorist agent so as to gather intelligence or evidence, they

must be continually breached. If that is the case it is unacceptable in terms

of law enforcement. The law enforcement authorities should not be put in

such a position. The rights of the terrorists themselves to a fair trial should

not be jeopardised by non-observance of the rules. Agents’ rights should not

be put at risk by inadequate protection under the rules, particularly as to the

disclosure of their identity.” 50

 

Comment: my underlining-it is clear that the MI5 Legal Adviser does not see how a participating informant of the type being run can be operating within the rule of law.

 

 

4.59 On 12 December 1990, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland wrote to the

then Home Secretary, the Rt Hon Kenneth Baker MP, enclosing a copy of the

new draft Guidelines produced by the Working Group.61 His letter summarised

the current position as follows:

“It has long been tacitly acknowledged that the current Home Office Guidance

on the use of participating informants was inappropriate in the current

terrorist context in Northern Ireland. That Guidance was drafted in 1969, ie

before the emergence of the current terrorist campaign, and it was therefore

designed essentially for ‘ordinary’ crime. Although the so-called ‘Home

Office Guidelines’ are not, of course, binding on the RUC in the absence of

any other guidance, they have been adopted as a general yardstick for RUC

operations, at least as far as non-terrorist crime is concerned.

 

Comment: this contradicts de Silva’s earlier statement that the guidelines were never applied to the RUC

The RUC have strongly represented – and have been supported in this by ‘outsiders’

like Mr Stalker and the late Mr McLachlan – that a completely new set of

Guidelines are required. They want Guidelines which would recognise the

need to allow informants providing vital intelligence to take part in serious

crime provided that certain criteria were met and under the strict supervision

of a senior officer.” 62

 

Comment: this is on the face of it, an extraordinary demand. The request is that participating informants should commit serious criminal offences and be not prosecuted, if they are providing “vital intelligence”. It suggests that this is already happening and that RUC SB simply want it “recognised”.

 

4.65 Blelloch’s Report was circulated by the then NIO Permanent Secretary, John

Chilcot, on 15 July 1992.67Blelloch produced a range of recommendations for

the better management and handling of agent activities in Northern Ireland.

However, as he noted in the Report, the question of the guidance to be issued

regarding the position under the criminal law of agents, their handlers and others

engaged in the intelligence process was one that he was not able finally to

resolve. He described the position as follows:

“It has long been acknowledged that the current Home Office Guidelines on

the use of participating informants are inappropriate in the current terrorist

context in Northern Ireland. The Guidelines were drafted in 1969 before the

emergence of the current terrorist campaign and were accordingly designed

essentially for dealing with ‘ordinary’ crime …

These issues were raised both by Mr Stalker and subsequently by Mr

McLachlan in their reports of 1987/1988. A NIO-led Working Party has since

drawn up, in 1990, a revised set of draft Guidelines … These have been

seen and endorsed by the Chief Constable of the RUC but have not, as yet,

received collective Ministerial approval. The Security Service have in the

meantime for practical purposes been following them, as have the Army.

The RUC in their somewhat different circumstances have not. There, for the

moment, the matter rests.

 

Comment: it is striking that MI5 and the Army, aka FRU etc seem to be content to use the new guidelines, but not the RUC. I wonder why?

The Nelson case has revived the issue. Source handlers and sources have

both queried, as well they might, what, with Nelson in prison, their position

now is and neither can at present be given a very satisfactory answer …

[T]here is something manifestly unsatisfactory about a situation in which

people are expected by Government to undertake difficult and often very

dangerous tasks without, as far they can see, any clear idea of the extent of

the support they can expect if things go wrong.

Nothing has emerged in the context of this review of agent handling to

suggest that the content of the [proposed] draft Guidelines … should be

revised: the problem is one of the status of the document, and, specifically,

the extent of Ministerial approval. The need to clarify this status seems to the

review team to be a matter of some urgency now, and, moreover, one that

will not go away …” [Emphasis in original]68

Chilcot’s letter of 15 July 1992 distributing the Blelloch Report also enclosed a

copy of a minute from the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Sir Patrick

Mayhew. The minute endorsed the report but gave the following comment on the

section regarding agent-handling guidelines:

“… I believe the position is more straightforward than the Report suggests.

… The starting point is that an agent may not, and may not be ‘authorised’ to,

commit a criminal offence. A criminal offence, however, requires a criminal

mind: for all practical purposes no offence will be committed by an agent

whose act is not accompanied by a criminal mind – that is to say, a mind

desirous of the commission of the relevant offences.

Subject to the views of the Attorney General, I consider that, for example,

the ostensible membership of a proscribed organisation acquired by an

agent for the purpose of contributing to the prevention of the organisation’s

objectives is not criminal in character. Similarly, an act that is relevant to

the criminal law of attempt, is not criminal in character if it is done with the

purpose of permitting the actor to participate in the subsequent frustration of

the offence.” 69

 

Comment: let’s consider an example. Agent 1234 tells his handler that his ASU is going to plant a bomb below a policeman’s car. Agent 1234 is to pick up the device and deliver it to the planter. According to Mayhew [who I knew and liked] Agent 1234 has no guilty mind because he does not intend the bombing to take place and/or at the moment when he hands the bomb over it is merely an attempt , not an actual bombing.

4.67 Commenting on that suggestion in a minute dated 25 August 1992, the then

Attorney General, Sir Nicholas Lyell QC, said:

“I recognise there is a serious argument, as you suggest in your minute, that

someone who participates in a particular crime with the intention of actually

frustrating that crime is not guilty as a secondary party. But even if that is

right, and it must be recognised that the law in this area is not yet clearly

developed, it would not assist the individual who participates in a crime not

with the object of frustrating that particular incident but with the intention of

maintaining his cover in order to help the Security Forces generally or to

permit them to prevent a subsequent crime or to arrest those concerned

after the event.

 

Comment: here the Attorney General gets to the core of the problem. The issue that apologists for the Special Branch, like Dr Matchett, cannot answer. Agent 1234 not only hands over the bomb but he drives the bomber to the scene and the policeman is murdered. Is the Agent to receive an amnesty because to have intercepted the bomb might have betrayed the presence of an informer? How many such operations might be authorized for this agent?

It may be that the courts would also recognise a more general defence for

undercover agents based on considerations of expediency or necessity. But

again the very existence of such a defence, let alone its precise scope, is

uncertain and I see no way in which an informant could properly be told to

rely on it.

Clear evidence of motive and intention may of course be highly relevant in

the analysis of any potentially criminal conduct which comes to the notice of

the prosecuting authorities in relation both to sufficiency of evidence and to

consideration of the public interest. But it remains my firm view that this must

be a matter for the prosecuting authorities after the event and in the light of

all the circumstances. There cannot be a basis for the approval of guidelines

which might be said to purport to condone in advance conduct which would

properly be the subject of criminal proceedings.”

 

Comment: my underlining- here the A-G again gets to the core of the problem. No guidelines which pre-approve  serious criminal conduct can ever be legal.

 

4.69 Further insight into the Attorney General’s perspective can be gained from the

minutes of that meeting which noted, in relation to one of the options under

consideration (“Option 3: 1990 Guidelines to be approved by the Attorney

General ”), that:

“… the Attorney General could not approve any guideline which appeared to

condone in advance the commission of serious criminal acts. Responding to

the point that even were he brought to do it the pressure of the first difficult

case would make his position intolerable … [the Legal Secretary to the Law

Officers] agreed and added that the Attorney did not believe that this option

could be delivered.” 71

 

4.71 On 14 July 1993 Chilcot submitted a note to the Secretary of State setting out

the conclusions of the Interdepartmental Working Group, which he summarised

as follows:

“… the present situation is not satisfactory. The existing law appears to leave

agents, handlers, and others involved in the intelligence process – including

Ministers – unduly exposed. This has practical drawbacks (in terms of our

ability to run agents, who are vital to our work against terrorism) as well as

political and ethical ones.

There is much that can, and should, be done on a non-statutory basis to

improve matters. The Blelloch recommendations will help (although they

are primarily directed to army agent handling, whilst the underlying problem

affects all agencies). So will further elaboration of the existing schemes of

guidance and regulation within agencies, based around a common core

understanding both of the law and of best practice. Nonetheless, a stable

and satisfactory way forward, which is fair to agents, handlers and the others

could only (in the view of my group) be achieved by new legislation.” 74

4.72 Thereafter the Cabinet sub-committee on Northern Ireland, under the Prime

Minister’s chairmanship, considered papers from the Secretary of State for

Northern Ireland on 29 July and September 1993. An internal Home Office briefing

note dated 1 September 1994 summarised the results of these discussions

as follows:

“The Northern Ireland Secretary and the Attorney, with some support

from the Defence Secretary, argued strongly that a statutory solution was

necessary. The Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, the Home Secretary

and the Chancellor of the Exchequer all expressed grave reservations about

opening up such a sensitive area to Parliament when the slenderness of the

Government’s majority could not guarantee a satisfactory outcome.

Formally the meetings were not conclusive in that the committee left open

the possibility of legislation if further work by the NIO failed to identify a

satisfactory non-statutory solution.” 75

4.73 The changing political landscape in Northern Ireland, however, appears to have

diminished the impetus to resolve the problem. The briefing note goes on to

comment that:

“The issue has not subsequently been referred back to Ministers though

there have been occasional meetings of the NIO working group … Given

Ministers’ declared view and the new context created by the Joint Declaration

we have endorsed the NIO view that the issue is best played long. Moreover,

some of the alarm in the immediate aftermath of the Nelson case has abated.

The argument that increased uncertainty about the legality of particular

operations would make agent recruitment and handling more difficult was

probably overstated …

The PIRA announcement of a cessation of violence must increase the

possibility that the policy issue will quietly be laid to rest unless the police

and other agencies start to argue (as they have not yet done) that the law

needs to be changed to buttress their covert operations against other forms

of serious crime. The 1969 circular remains an embarrassment but the line

will have to be that the police and each of the agencies rely primarily on their

own internal (unpublished) guidelines and that they are, in addition, subject

to the ultimate oversight of the prosecuting authorities and the courts.” 76

4.74 Sir Patrick Mayhew minuted the Prime Minister on 28 May 1995 with the following

update on agent-handling:

“In my minute of 11 January I reported that the official Working Group on

Agent Handling remained of the view that the shortcomings in the existing

arrangements for running agents may satisfactorily be resolved only by

legislation, but that the absence of a suitable legislative opportunity and the

uncertainties over the peace process meant that the time was not yet right

to take a final decision on the matter …

With the [PIRA and loyalist] ceasefires in Northern Ireland continuing to hold,

the need to resolve the issue will not be compelling, unless the situation

deteriorates. I still consider that legislation is the only effective solution, as

officials have been unable to produce any viable non-statutory proposals.

However, I doubt there will be a suitable opportunity for legislation on this

topic in this Parliament … I suggest therefore that unless things change we

simply continue to keep open the possibility of legislating … on the issue

when an opportunity arises.” 77

4.75 The necessary legislation was eventually passed (under a different administration)

in the form of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA).

 

Overview

 

4.85 As the running of agents lies at the heart of this Review, I have dealt with the

history of the applicable guidance at some length.

4.86 It is absolutely clear that there was no adequate agent-handling guidance

or direction whatsoever in the late 1980s. The 1969 Home Office Guidelines

had not been designed for a counter-terrorism situation and had, rightly, been

discarded.

 

Comment de Silva again falls into error. The guidelines had not been discarded by RUC CID. The CID ran agents, many of who were involved in terrorism.  What the Special Branch wanted would never have been granted, that is clear. They wanted rules to permit them to run agents who participated in serious crime, including murder. They ran these agents in any event, without the cover of the State. Therein lies much of what is appearing in the Belfast News Letter, under cover of the response to the legacy consultation. A police officer swears to uphold the law and to protect life. A soldier or an agent swears no such oath.

 

The FRU Directives and Instructions were manifestly unsatisfactory

and the Security Service similarly lacked any external framework for assessing

the extent to which agents could become involved in criminality. Successive

reports and representations from senior RUC, Security Service and (latterly)

Army officers had highlighted the fact that this situation was unacceptable.

4.87 In such circumstances the UK Government had a duty to provide an effective

statutory framework and clear policy direction. The issue was considered

extensively at Cabinet level and Government Ministers were clearly aware

that agents were being handled in Northern Ireland without reference to any

adequate guidelines because no such framework existed. Ministers nonetheless

continued to place a high priority on pursuing an intelligence-led approach to the

terrorist threat. The result of this was that agent-handlers and their supervisors

were being asked to perform a task – namely the penetration of agents to the

heart of a terrorist group – that, in some cases, could not be carried out in a way

that was both effective and lawful.

4.88 What was required was a clear statutory recognition that agents must be run at

the heart of terrorist groups; some recognised limits as to the extent to which

agents could become involved in criminal enterprises; and a rigorous regulatory

framework to prevent abuses. RIPA subsequently demonstrated the type of

statutory regime that should have been applied much earlier in the context of

Northern Ireland. However, it is doubtful whether RIPA and its associated Code

of Practice provides a real resolution to these difficult issues given that it provides

little guidance as to the limits of the activities of covert human intelligence sources.

4.89 Many of the grave issues relating to the involvement of agents in the murder of

Patrick Finucane must, therefore, be considered in the context of the wilful and

abject failure by the UK Government to put in place adequate guidance and

regulation for the running of agents.

[R/15] said that the gistthat he took from the Government’s response was, in effect, ‘carry on with

what you’re doing but don’t tell us the details’. This remained the attitude

until around 2000 when the effect of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA)

coming into force required the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000

(RIPA) to be passed to deal with the situation.” 81

 

Similarly,although RUC SB officers undertook training and received supervision, I have not

seen any evidence to suggest they were provided with training or briefing on the

legal implications of agent-running. This is, however, not particularly surprising

given the absence of a statutory framework on which to base any such training

or guidance.

 

So , let’s return to George’s bullet points:

 

  • Police officers managed agents-yes
  • There was no regulatory framework-incorrect, it just wasn’t applied to SB
  • Officers set their own standards-looks like they did
  • They were unaccountable to the law-they have got away with it so far
  • There was no law-the law was ignored
  • Policing was being done in a vacuum-wrong, policing is always done within the law
  • There was unregulated practice-definitely
  • The RUC had asked the Government for a framework, guidance or legislation on many occasions-yes, but what they wanted was undeliverable and would not be countenanced under RIPA

Final comment

There are no bad soldiers, only bad generals. RUC high command turned a blind eye to SB and all its works. The consequences were as Hamilton says , mistakes were made and lives were lost. There is no such thing as the ‘greater good’ as an excuse for facilitating murder.

The outcome is that the state and in particular the PSNI is concealing millions of documents that would , as in Ballast or de Silva, show the extent of malpractice.

Hundreds of cases turn on the availability of these documents.

It’s not only SFIRA who want to re-write history.

Flushing out the Special Branch

 

 

Readers of this blog will know that my basic premise is that , my parents’ murders included, the State permitted or acquiesced in the deaths of its citizens “for the greater good”.

Let me again follow the logic.

You are a handler. Your tout/informer/agent-it matters not on the nomenclature, has risen to an important role within PIRA. He is part of the targeting, planning and execution process. He is telling you who are in the ASUs, who the Quartermaster is, where the explosives are stored and who is making the bombs.  If you act on this information, you could disrupt activity by seizing the Semtex. You will have no evidence to put before a court , because the Supergrass system has been discredited and in any event your informer is unwilling to give evidence.

Alternatively, you could act to thwart the operations that your informer tells you about. After a few failures, PIRA are going to put two and two together and that’s the end of your informer.

So , in the grand scheme, some attacks have to get through.

A value judgement has to be made. Who do we sacrifice “for the greater good”?

Not Bobby Carswell, Jeffrey Donaldson, Gerry Adams, Brian Gillen or …

 

As the former head of MI5 said, life can be messy.

Some unimportant people have to be sacrificed to protect the informer. The higher up in the chain of command is the informer, the greater the ‘product’ and the greater the need to protect him.

That’s my theory, Dear Reader. So let’s test some aspects of it.

What rules applied to RUC Special Branch prior to 2000?

Let’s get it from the horse’s mouth. After my last blog was republished on a site called Expose the Republican Narrative a contributor , calling himself “Angus McTavish” offered a riposte.

I have found out  who this person is, but I’m going to call him, for the purposes of debate “Jonty”.

Jonty has taken the time to offer rebuttal to most of my points, though he fails  to recognise some tongue in cheek humour. But never mind.

He does , however , provide a window into the world of Special Branch, which he says he inhabited for a quarter of a century.

This is what he says about the rules.

 

“De Siva
4.5 – at the risk of repeating myself, De Silva seems to recognise a fact that has escaped the attention of both Nuala O’Loan and Michael Maguire, when they fail to recognise sufficiently, that intelligence agents, in order to operate as agents, must show support for the aims and objectives of their terrorist grouping. Furthermore, they must, if they are to be trusted within that group, carry out at least some actions which could be described as terrorist activity. Prior to RIPA (2000), this tactical imperative was conducted under the broad scope of agent handling tradecraft and regulated by the oversight of senior officers within RUCSB. It is recognised under RIPA (2000) as legal, justified and necessary deployment of CHIS/agents/touts, call them what you will. “

 

 

He goes on:

 

  • Informers/handlers were allowed to commit crimes, including murder – “In the pursuance of a goal of public safety, agents were indeed permitted by handlers to support terrorist groups and even on occasions to engage in criminal activity on their behalf. This behaviour was neither a crime by the agent or the handler and was finally given legal protection in 2000 under RIPA. Murder was not permitted and despite the best investigative efforts of journalists galore, Human Rights organisations (both legitimate and utterly biased), the PONI and several historical inquiries and reviews, not one handler has indeed ever been prosecuted, which in itself provides strong evidence that the claims made both here and on a multitude of previous occasions, are baseless. Any evidence to the contrary, has yet to be uncovered and the mantra is wearing distinctly thin now.”

So let’s deal with Jonty’s argument. The agent must carry out “terrorist activity” and “even on occasions to engage in criminal activity on their behalf” in order  to survive. “Murder was not permitted”, says Jonty. I wonder where that is in his rule book?

Prior to RIPA the United Kingdom’s Home Office guidelines on the use of informants was the only policy the  Special Branch  had to follow. The guidelines stated the police should never use an informant to encourage another to commit a crime; police officers should not counsel, incite, or procure the commission of a crime and protecting informants does not grant the informant immunity from arrest or prosecution for the crime they fully participate in.

 

Here is the full text. The typos and strange layout are original.

 

“Our rcfncncc: POL/ 69 1050/1/1

Four rtftrtnct:

HOME OFFICE

Horsefcrry House, Dean Ryie Street, London S.W.i

Telex: 24986

Telephone: 01-834 6655, ext.

 

12th May. L969

 

Dear Chief Constable,

HOME OFFICE CIRCULAR NO, 97/1969

Informants who take part in crime

 

The Home Secretary’s attention has been drawn to judicial comment in the appeal of Cork, Colman and Macro and to criticism of police action in several other cases involving police use of informants who took part in crime . He sought information about police practice from the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and through H.M. Inspectors of Constabulary. The Central Conference on 6th March gave an opportunity for a general discussion of practices and principles.

 

2* The Conference fully recognised that informants, properly employed, were

essential to criminal investigation and that, within limits, they ought to be protected. The risks attached to their employment were obvious, however, and safeguards were needed before use was made of an informant taking part in crime.

The Conference appreciated that circumstances varied so widely that it was difficult- to establish rules of general application; but the discussion

 identified the principles listed in the next paragraph.

 

  1. The Conference in general agreed on the following points.

 

(a) No member of a police force, and no police informant, should counsel,

incite or procure the commission of a crime.

 

(b) Where an informant gives the police information about the intention of

others to commit a crime in which they intend that he shall play a part,

his participation should be allowed to continue only. where :-

 

(i) he does not actively engage in planning and committing the crime;

 

(ii) he is intended to play only a minor role; and

 

(iii) his participation is essential to enable the police to frustrate

the principal criminals and to arrest them (albeit for lesser offences

such as attempt or conspiracy to commit the crime, or carrying of

weapons) before injury is done to any person or serious damage to

property.

 

The informant should always be instructed that he must on no account act

as agent provocateur , whether by suggesting to others that they should commit offences or encouraging them to do so, and that if he is found to have done so he will himself be liable to prosecution.

Ac) ,

The Chi- f Constable

(c) The police must never commit themselves to a course which, whether to

protect an informant or otherwise, will constrain them to mislead a court  

in any subsequent proceedings* This must always be regarded as a prime

consideration when deciding whether, and in what manner, an informant may be used and how far, if at all, he is to be allowed to take part in an offence.

If his use in the way envisaged will, or is likely to, result in its being

impossible to protect him without subsequently misleading the court, that must be regarded as a decisive reason for his not being so used or not being

protected.

(d) The need to protect an informant does not justify granting him immunity

from arrest or prosecution for the crime if he fully participates in it    with the requisite intent (still less in respect of any other crime he has committed or may in future commit),

(e) The handling of informants calls for the judgment of an experienced

officer, there must be complete confidence and frankness between

supervising officers and subordinates, and every chief officer of police

 should ensure effective supervision of his detectives; a decision to use a participating

informant should be taken at senior level.

 

(f) Payment to informants from public funds should be supervised by a

Senior officer.

 

(g) Where an informant has been used who has taken part in the commission

of a crime for which others have been arrested, the prosecuting solicitor,

counsel, and (where he is concerned) the Director of Public Prosecutions

should be informed of the fact and of the part that the informant took in the commission of the offence, although, subject to (c) above, not

necessarily of his identity.

(h) Careful instruction should be given to detectives in training.

 

  1. The Home Secretary fully endorses these broad principles. He feels sure that

they are already widely applied in the police service; but in view of recent public

interest he thinks it right to bring them to the notice of all chief officers of police. He asks that you will find means of commending them to everyone who may be concerned in your force. He has instructed H.M. Inspectors of Constabulary to pay particular attention, in the course of their inspections, to the arrangements made in police forces for supervision and training in these matters.

 

Yours sincerely,”

 

Here is what Chief Constable George Hamilton said in a speech in may of this year:

“The problem was much bigger and more complex than the “few bad apples” analogy that has been articulated previously. In the absence of any regulatory framework for managing “agents” police officers were left to set their own standards, they were unaccountable to the law because there was no law. They were unaccountable to their fellow citizens. Policing was being done in a vacuum that allowed unregulated practice. Honest individuals were placed in impossible situations, having to choose between bad and worse. Many people lived; but some people also died as a result of that practice.

The environment in which they worked was chaotic – terrorist attacks were happening on a daily basis, and many lives were being lost. Investigations struggled to keep pace with the rate of murder and serious injury.  The pressure was extreme. In these extraordinarily difficult and dangerous circumstances, the intent with which the vast majority of decisions were made was for the protection of the community. But they were, on many occasions, decisions and judgements that should not have been taken; and, I believe, would not have been taken if there had been a proper regulatory framework in place.

The RUC recognised the almost impossible situation they were in and the Da Silva Review makes reference to the fact that the RUC had asked Government for a framework, guidance or legislation on many occasions. Nothing was forthcoming.”

 

First, he is wrong and completely misleading to suggest there were no rules, secondly he appears to admit that agents were allowed to kill or be involved in killing.

Additionally, Northern Ireland had an interesting piece of legislation. The Criminal Law Act  (Northern Ireland) 1967, Section 5.

 

Penalties for concealing offences etc.

(1)Subject to the succeeding provisions of this section, where a person has committed [F1a relevant offence]F1, it shall be the duty of every other person, who knows or believes—

(a)that the offence or some [F2other relevant offence]F2 has been committed; and

(b)that he has information which is likely to secure, or to be of material assistance in securing, the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of any person for that offence;

to give that information, within a reasonable time, to a constable and if, without reasonable excuse, he fails to do so he shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment according to the gravity of the offence about which he does not give that information, as follows:—

(i)if that offence is one for which the court is required by law to sentence an offender to death or to imprisonment for life or to detention during the pleasure of the Governor of Northern Ireland, he shall be liable to imprisonment for not more than ten years;

(ii)if it is one for which a person (of full age and capacity and not previously convicted) may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of fourteen years, he shall be liable to imprisonment for not more than seven years;

(iii)if it is not one included above but is one for which a person (of full age and capacity and not previously convicted) may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of ten years, he shall be liable to imprisonment for not more than five years;

(iv)in any other case, he shall be liable to imprisonment for not more than three years.

So Jonty is wrong in so many ways.

  • There were rules
  • The rules did not permit the carrying out of continuous crimes by agents
  • Handlers broke the law if they turned a blind eye
  • RIPA did not provide legal protection for criminality by agents

The awful truth is that Special Branch were told that the “ordinary” rules regarding informers or agents did not apply to them.

 

I’m sure Dear Reader , you will look forward to a cogent reply from Jonty, Dr William or Dr Tim or any other member of the RUC who claims to have been at the cutting edge of Special Branch.

 

Next up for the blog will be a demolition of George’s recent speech.

Jeffrey Donaldson’s new car

Following on from my last blog on this, I have test driven the new model, that Jeffrey recommends.

This is the one that the populace are asked to buy,  by way of a “consultation”.

The draft Bill  is 68 clauses long, and it has 19 schedules. It runs to 120 pages. The section on the HIU has 38 clauses and 16 schedules.

Jeffrey,  is the DUP’s spokesman on victims’ issues, so we might assume that he knows what he is talking about.

Lets look at some of the things he has said in Parliament about the establishment of the HIU.

“At present, in fairness to the victims and families who have waited a long time, the proposal is that the historical investigations unit would pick up where the historical inquiries team left off in chronological order. It would be wrong to go back to the beginning and start again, leaving the people who have already waited many years having to wait even longer.”

What does the draft legislation say? Clause 8; deaths must be investigated in chronological order [unless there are exceptional circumstances] . So nul points for that statement.

“It is important that the Government now proceed with the Stormont House agreement and get on with publishing the draft legislation to give innocent victims and others the opportunity to comment on the proposals, so that at last we can begin the process of implementing what has been agreed and the focus will no longer be solely on what the state did.”

This is a consultation, not an opportunity to comment on proposals. Here is a brief summary of what that means:

(1) consultation must be at a time when proposals are still at a formative stage (2) the proposer must give sufficient reasons for any proposal to permit of intelligent consideration and response, and (3) adequate time must be given for consideration and response and (4) that the product of consultation must be conscientiously taken into account in finalising any statutory proposals.

So its not just as simple as Jeffrey would like it to be. What if citizens reject the proposal? Jeffrey asserts that it has been agreed. So is this consultation a sham and a waste of time?

“We endorse the institutions proposed under the agreement, including a new historical investigations unit that would have full police powers, and would take over the work of the PSNI’s legacy investigation branch and the responsibility for reinvestigating the unsolved murders linked to the troubles in Northern Ireland.”

“Two years ago, we reached an agreement in Stormont about the legacy issues and several new institutions were proposed, including an historical investigations unit that would have full police powers to revisit the unsolved murders. The main impact of the establishment of that unit would be that the murders committed by the terrorists would finally be subjected to proper scrutiny and reinvestigation, and the innocent victims that the hon. Member for South Down referred to would have the opportunity to have their cases re-examined to see whether there was the prospect of prosecution and people being brought to justice.”

It’s important to couple these statements, representing a bright shining JeffreyLand and compare them against reality. Here is what the Bill proposes:

Not all troubles related deaths are to be investigated. A time frame has been specified.

Only those which are currently on the books of the PSNI or the PONI will be considered. So if you relative’s case is not with either of these bodies, generally speaking you will not qualify.

Each of these bodies must certify to the HIU that the death requires further investigation. Many will not be so certified and will therefore not be investigated.

HIU is only  to investigate any of these deaths it takes on  if there is “new evidence”

This means evidence that PSNI/RUC or PONI or HIU  did not know of or knew of but was not aware of the relationship between the evidence and the death.

But. The new evidence is to be assessed for credibility and the evidence is to be taken into account with all other relevant information.

So if the HIU thinks the evidence is weak or it is leaned upon by the Spooks , you case will also fall by the wayside.

The Shawcross test is certainly present in Clause 7, where the HIU must not do anything which might prejudice the national security interests of the UK, put at risk the life or safety of any person. This is the get-out to protect informers, who were present or participated in many of the murders.

The suggested presence of informers is a feature of many troubles murders. Some also may involve participating informants. To date these cases have not been solved because of the State’s activity in hiding these persons. The State will continue to hide them.

There seems to be no mechanism for a relative or interested person to make a fresh complaint to the HIU.

The HIU is forbidden from duplicating work. So the HIU could read the papers from the PSNI or the PONI, decide that it will not duplicate the work, that there is no new evidence and bin the case.

Let’s assume that the HIU considers that maybe there is an agent or informer or some State actor. It has no access to the Spooks’ warehouses. It has to ask for information. If you don’t know what the Spooks have got then it’s hard to ask for it. On the other hand the Spooks are under no obligation to hand over information, no matter how relevant it might be.

This could have been [partially] resolved by giving HIU unlimited access to the warehouses. How likely is that?

Worse, the Secretary of State  and the Department of Justice  can both make regulations limiting the use of secrets.

As a general weapon, the HIU director can bin cases under clause 9 if he feels that they will hinder the completion of his task in five years.

So, how more effective will the HIU be, compared to PSNI/LIB or PONI?

The answer is , not a lot. The Bill is State sponsored sleight of hand. All the faults of the HET , the LIB and the PONI HID are present here. Worse, the State has tightened up the control of State secrets, so informers and agents are better protected than ever. How many cases will be investigated? Nobody knows  but it certainly will not be Jeffrey’s assertion that:

“the innocent victims that the hon. Member for South Down referred to would have the opportunity to have their cases re-examined to see whether there was the prospect of prosecution and people being brought to justice.”

If I were guessing the number would be in the hundreds, not thousands.

Jeffrey, as the DUP victims’ expert,   is knowingly  selling the same old model of car [HET/LIB/HID] , with a new paint job, a radio and go-faster stripes. It still handles badly, takes ages to get anywhere and lets you down at the vital moment.

Don’t buy it!

 

 

 

 

 

Would you buy a used car from Jeffrey Donaldson?

In the sixties , cars were pretty basic. The standard model had no radio, no heater and no carpets. For those you had to buy the “de luxe” model.

Neither were there many improvements or innovations.

So, in order to sell more models , the company would advertise the “new 1967 model” , which would just be like the 1966 model , except that it would have a different paint job, a new grille and go-faster stripes.

The Historical Enquiries Team was dreamt up by the Brits to make the citizen think that the State was somehow interested in solving the murders of their loved ones. It was a sop, which Sinn Fein IRA were happy  to go along with because they had been assured that it would also be a flop. Its modus operandi was to obtain the box containing the investigation file and associated items, dump them onto a desk, read them and put them back in the box. They then used a boiler plate template to produce a “report”. Those of us who objected to this charade were given the privilege of a “focussed report” where the team got off its ass and interviewed a few superannuated RUC men , who could remember nothing.

It was the basic model of investigation.

But now, a new model is in the showroom. The “de Luxe HIU”.

It has those go faster stripes, paint job and grille. But no heater or radio.

And its being sold by this man, your friendly knight of the showroom, Jeffrey Donaldson.

Jeffrey Donaldson

Here’s what he had to say about the HIU and all its works at a Westminster hall debate on 10 January 2017.

 

“Two years ago, we reached an agreement in Stormont about the legacy issues and several new institutions were proposed, including an historical investigations unit that would have full police powers to revisit the unsolved murders. The main impact of the establishment of that unit would be that the murders committed by the terrorists would finally be subjected to proper scrutiny and reinvestigation, and the innocent victims that the hon. Member for South Down referred to would have the opportunity to have their cases re-examined to see whether there was the prospect of prosecution and people being brought to justice. I accept the point that the hon. Member for South Antrim made about getting evidence for cases from so long ago.

The Stormont House agreement is there. There is currently an impasse between Sinn Féin and the Government on national security. Sinn Féin are demanding that this Government fully disclose in the public domain everything that happened, which would mean that if the Special Air Service had carried out an operation in Loughgall and shot members of the Provisional IRA who were exploding a bomb outside a police station, all that the SAS did—all the rationale, all its modus operandi and all the military planning that went into that operation—would be out in the public domain. How could we ever counter terrorism again if we put in the public domain the very methods that we use to detect what is happening and safeguard life? It is a nonsense that a former terrorist organisation should have the right to demand that a lawful Government put that information in the public domain.

The Government must hold the line on national security; further, they should act now. They need to proceed with the Stormont House agreement.”

Like most car salesmen, Dear Reader , this one is prone to exaggeration and not to be trusted.

His sales patter is a farrago of lies.

What are they?

In the next episode I will kick the tyres, open the bonnet and take Jeffrey’s de luxe model for a spin. Let’s see how it handles, compared to the old model, shall we?