ruc special branch

Drew Harris – liar or incompetent?

On 6th June 1990 the Provisional IRA placed a bomb under the car of James Sefton, a RUC officer, retired three years. The subsequent explosion killed him and his wife Ellen. My parents.

I began investigating the circumstances in 2002. I started with the PSNI.  I was bounced around between senior officers , including the “salad dodger’ , before finally meeting Chief Inspector Blair, who had evidently drawn the short straw.

He told me that the papers had been stored away. He did not know who had made that decision. Nor when the papers had been stored.  He was unable to give me any details about the investigation, if that is the correct word.

In March 2004 ACC Sam Kincaid informed me that the case was being examined  by the Serious Crime Review Team. You would be unsurprised, Dear Reader to learn that I never heard a word from this ‘team’ .

I asked the Historical Enquiries Team [lots of sporting analogies] to investigate. 

I also made a complaint to the Police Ombudsman.

Each of these organisations told me that they had had access to all intelligence and there was nothing to report.

I had correspondence with Drew Harris, then ACC Crime Operations [was this not a ‘team’?] .

He wrote : “ I can assure you that both the SCRT and the HET had full access to all available information and intelligence material during the course of their respective Reviews … Regrettably, the reviews conducted …did not uncover any new investigative opportunities.”

I sent a detailed reply:

1st September 2014

Dear Mr Harris,

                                      James and Ellen Sefton

Further to your letter of 11th August and my initial reply by email on 20th August, you state in your letter :

“I can assure you that both the SCRT and the HET had full access to all available information and intelligence information during the course of their respective enquiries.”

I would be glad if you would answer the following.

  1. On what do you base this assertion. Is it personal knowledge or are you relying on assurances given by others?
  2. If  the latter, who gave you these assurances?
  3. When you use the word “available”, what do you mean? Is it meant to qualify “intelligence”.
  4. Does the use of this word “available” indicate that someone decides to make information available to the investigators and if so,  who?
  5. Does the use of the word imply that there is other relevant information which has been withheld?

Dr Laura Lundy, in her paper, Can the past be policed? Lessons from the Historical Enquiries Team Northern Ireland, conducts a critique of , inter alia, the access to intelligence. What can be distilled from her report is the following:

  • Intelligence was still being found and collated while she was conducting her research. [I note Roy McComb’s late presentation of intelligence to the Smithwick Tribunal ]
  • “All aspects of intelligence are managed by former RUC and Special Branch (sic) officers”
  • “It appears that the ‘old guard’ play a key role in the management and access to intelligence and perform a censoring role in respect of disclosure.”
  • HET relies on the goodwill of partner agencies to cooperate. This would include the security services and Special Branch, now C3.

It appears to me that there could be three types of intelligence that may have been withheld in my parents’ case.

  1. Information held by a partner  agency or by the police which points to the person who planted the device or more importantly to those persons who directed and approved the operation.
  2. Information obtained by an informant , either participating or not, pointing to those responsible for directing planning approving or carrying the attack upon my parents.
  3. Similar information acquired by electronic or other means , not involving a CHIS.

 For example if  Special Branch had decided to withhold information at the time of the murders, it is possible that the same personnel could make the same decision, many years on. Certainly Sir John Hermon had his worries about “the Branch”.

I should be glad;

[a]  if you would assure me that no information has come to light since investigations were completed ;and

[b]  that no such information as set out above has been withheld from investigators by either the PSNI or any partner agency.

Yours sincerely,

Peter Sefton

Harris did not reply to this but delegated it to Detective Chief Superintendent Hanna, who wrote: “ACC Harris has management responsibility for Serious Crime Review Team and the Historical Enquiries Team, and so his response is based on his personal knowledge that both teams had full access to all available information during the course of their reviews.”

Hanna replied to further correspondence , on 29th October 2014:

“As previously pointed out PSNI have investigated the death of your parents and reviewed the investigation twice since the original investigation, there have been no new evidential opportunities identified”

The case papers were put in a box, again, and that was the last I heard from the PSNI. 

For context, Harris was the main man re intelligence and the point of contact for the Security Service until his appointment as Commissioner of AGS.

 However on 14th  June 1990 a communication was received by the RUC from An Garda Siochana  [“AGS”] , by letter [possibly faxed] 

The content was that the AGS had received intelligence from a ‘previously reliable source’ that there were threats to three RUC officers.

Namely:

James Stepton [sic]

A N Other

A N Other -serving in Tennent Street station

The source is recorded as stating that he overheard a conversation. He also provided a sketch map, hand drawn, which was communicated AGS-RUC.

I have seen that map , on a laptop computer screen.

  • An overheard conversation is often a euphemism for being present during the conversation. A handy way for a participating informant to distance himself from the operation.
  • The informant is likely to be a participating informant.
  •  There was no  ‘James Stepton’ on the force and a cursory investigation would have led the investigator to conclude to whom the report was referring.
  • The hand drawn map is , in many respects, accurate. It is undoubtedly of the Ballygomartin area. It shows  the turn of the road from the Woodvale Road to the Ballygomartin Road, Woodvale Park, Woodvale cricket ground, Glencairn park and a number of streets and roads. Although the writing is indistinct on the screen , I am satisfied that it also depicts Lyndhurst Gardens [my family home]and Westway Drive, the street immediately to the east of Lyndhurst Gardens.
  • The proportions are incorrect but the general ‘get up’ of the map shows a degree of local knowledge , which would not have been gleaned in an overheard conversation.
  • Most strikingly, there is an ‘X’ , or asterisk , which appears to be in Glencairn park an open area, not a street, which is east of Westway Drive and a line which appears to terminate at the top of Westway Drive.
  • If the significance of this is the location and then transport of a device, it would involve the navigation of a deep gully , a small stream and a similar climb on the other side, possibly to avoid patrols and Viper. 
  • It seems to me to be a planning document, showing how a bomb could be delivered to my parents’ house, avoiding the main roads. 

The information from the AGS was disseminated to the Regional Heads of Special Branch. 

One of the other officers who was mentioned in the message served at Tennent Street station and was warned about the threat. So we know that the message was acted upon by SB. 

Why did it not form part of an investigation into my parents’  murders?

Why has Harris insisted that there was no intelligence?

I am told by the Operation Kenova team, who turned up this intelligence, that they found it , stored within the RUC/PSNI intelligence systems.

A competent investigation team would have used the intel as a starting point. The reliable informant was telling AGS that he was present  [though he distances himself by stating that he overheard it] when an PIRA ASU planned the murders of three police officers. One was actually killed. The planning obviously took place before 6th June 1990, and likely took place in the Republic, possibly in Dundalk. His evidence would support a charge of conspiracy to murder.

The Army/Security Service had a number of  informants, including Scapaticci , in place in Dundalk and other places. Was the planning meeting bugged? Who were the planners? Was the AGS informant withholding their identities? Or were their identities known to AGS and withheld from the RUC?

If nobody in the RUC SB, on receipt of the intel said, do we have a James Stepton?- no but we have a James Sefton and he’s dead then they are truly incompetent. 

What happened in respect of the third person named I know not.

Harris gave evidence about his role to the Smithwick Tribunal in 2011. He said the following:

“I am responsible for all matters of intelligence, all matters in respect of homicide investigation. At the moment, I am also—have major responsibilities in respect of what’s known as legacy matters., and I would work closely with the historical inquiry team, who are investigating Troubles -related deaths, and they have some 3,260 deaths to investigate.”

Harris was given every opportunity to come clean on what he and others knew. When I said in my letter of 1st September 2014:

“It appears to me that there could be three types of intelligence that may have been withheld in my parents’ case.

  1. Information held by a partner  agency or by the police which points to the person who planted the device or more importantly to those persons who directed and approved the operation.
  2. Information obtained by an informant , either participating or not, pointing to those responsible for directing planning approving or carrying the attack upon my parents.
  3. Similar information acquired by electronic or other means , not involving a CHIS.“

Harris was being given a clear opportunity to disclose that information existed. 

Aside from his mendaciousness, the new information demonstrates what I have always alleged- that Special Branch cared not, even for their own and that this information, in existence for thirty four years , was known to a number of James’ colleagues, not one of whom disclosed it to me.

I am considering my next steps.

Money talks

It’s twenty years since I first took active steps to try and find the killers of my parents.

A Crown prosecutor for many years, it was slowly dawning on me that what I had been told, professionally, was not what it seemed in many cases.

I started gently, asking for an update on the killings, which had happened twelve years earlier. It might surprise the reader to know that in those twelve years , not one officer in charge had ever contacted me with an update.

My first enquiries were met with the usual obfuscation and it took many months before I had an intelligent response.

That was to tell me almost nothing. 

Where was the file? Well, it was clear that it had been put away many years before and no detective  had given it a second thought in those years.

What followed was a succession of promises from lots of senior officers who , shortly afterwards retired.

I will not trouble you Dear Reader, with the HET or the Police Ombudsman, because my target is elsewhere.

Follow the money

The Patten payment scheme, ostensibly designed to remove sufficient officers to achieve some parity of religious breakdown in the police, was a bonanza to members of the RUC.

A fifty year old superintendent with thirty years enhanced pensionable service could expect a lump sum of £300,000 and an annual pension of £27,000.

A constable in similar circumstances could expect a lump sum of £134,000 and an annual sum of £13,000.

There were other benefits too. Money to train to be a mountain guide in the Mournes, for example.

Four thousand officers took the Patten offer.

Then there were revised injury on duty schemes.

Then there was a hearing loss scheme.

All-in-all the State paid out more than half a billion pounds to ex-RUC officers.

What did it get in return?

The absolute unwavering silence of every member of the RUC about any information relating to wrongdoing by its members, even if it resulted in the death of a colleague.

For the State, the mirror image is the menu of on-the-runs, Royal Pardons and huge sums paid to SFIRA.

In the last twenty years a number of police officers, known to me personally, and for whom, on occasions I had given advice, pro bono; could have given me information, evidence, a hint, a ‘steer’ or a nod, about the circumstances of the killing of one of their own [and his wife].

Apart from one seriously unwell detective, not one of these heroes opened their mouths. 

Let me give you an example, Dear Reader.

Alan Simpson was the senior CID officer in D Division on the day of the bomb, 6th June 1990. I met him, I think , that day or the next. I certainly met him at the inquests, because he was managing them.

Years on, an intermediary, who I had helped, suggested that Simpson might be willing to meet me and  discuss the case. A date was set , I awaited his arrival but was told instead that he was too ill to meet me.

I suggested that, if I could communicate by email, that would suffice.

He provided his email.

I wrote to him.

On 7/23/20, peter sefton  wrote:

“Alan

Thank you for providing your email address.
My parents were murdered by PIRA by a PIRA ucbt on the Ballygomartin Road on
the morning of 6 June 1990.
I think that you were in Tennent St at the time, in charge of CID.
I seem to recall that we met, once at least, at the inquest.
On the day of their deaths or the next day, I was in Tennent St and I was
taken to a room and shown a wall display of the suspected bomb team,
including their photographs. I believe one may have been a woman and another
was a Finucane.
I have been campaigning for justice for them, actively, since 2002 and very
pro-actively , since 2014.
I know that a person called Braniff was arrested and questioned shortly
after the deaths but was released without charge.
My question is :
As CID commander, did you receive intel from the Branch or any other entity,
including a CHIS , as to the identity of the culprits? Were any suspects
protected by the Branch, FRU/Army or MI5?
My hypothesis is that PIRA were so infiltrated by the State that, even if
advance knowledge was not available [though I have reservations about that
scenario] identities would have been ascertained in the aftermath. So it is
a matter of great distress to me that no prosecution ensued.
Time for me is short and I would like to unlock this case sooner rather than
later.

Regards

Peter Sefton”

Within 24 hours he replied:

“Hello Peter,

Thank you for your email.

My desk is almost clear now and I will be in touch probably over the weekend.

Best…..

Alan.”

He never did reply. Big desk. 

My intermediary was apologetic but assured me that Simpson was ‘very unwell’.

I heard no more from Simpson but was mildly interested that he wrote to the Times on the deaths of Lords Hutton and Kerr, suggesting that he had met them in the course of his duties. Then he published an article in the Belfast Telegraph on 19th January this year. I don’t subscribe to this rag and the article, behind the paywall began:

Colleagues  fed me a false line on Finucane killing writes Alan Simpson 

“As a former RUC CID Detective Superintendent, I was greatly disappointed, but not surprised, at the Police Ombudsman’s recent finding that there had been “collusive behaviours” by elements of Special Branch when dealing with UDA killer gangs in the north-west of the province.”

Perhaps  he has a ghost writer or he has risen Lazarus- like from his bed or perhaps his solicitor , Kevin Winters, has inspired him to write about Finucane but not Jimmy Sefton.

Let me be clear, in the course of my career I met many brave, devoted and honest police officers.

I also met rogues, cowards and liars, the latter too often in the course of a trial.

My observations are directed at those whose  help I have sought, directly or indirectly, who have been motivated by one thing.

Money

I could name these men. But, aside from the most egregious,  Alan Simpson, I won’t.

What lesson can we learn?

The State has bought their compliance and silence.

The operation to kill Jimmy Sefton, happily retired but not on Patten, aged 65 and by implication, his wife, wasn’t sketched out on the back of a fag packet. It was scouted, planned , approved at the highest levels in PIRA. It is inconceivable that informers, agents, touts, whatever you want to call them, were not involved. It is inconceivable that Special Branch did not have information and that some or all of that was not shared with CID. 

Without exaggeration, it is likely that a dozen RUC officers have information that would be useful to their case. 

The same silence operated against my parents is practised when investigations into other killings are carried out by other bodies. 

Some of these culprits think nothing of instructing solicitors on their own behalf and for their own cases  who are , shall we say, critical of the State.

This blog is written more in sorrow than in anger. I saw enough  in my time of corruption at the highest levels of the RUC. Often it was at the expense of their junior colleagues and of justice; but killing is in another realm.

The fact remains that “one of their own” will receive no justice because money talks.

Many of the men of whom I speak profess Christianity.

Proverbs 11:4

Readers may have read , already, my last blog about Alan Mains. He was the subject of a gushing Belfast Telegraph article, describing him as “flying high in the world of private business”. He is nothing of the sort , of course. Read my tweets for a blow by blow demolition of his claims of directorships. SecuriGroup , when I contacted them, refused to describe his role-it is certainly not as a director in any shape or form. He was never a director of Ultimate Leisure or any of Bob Senior’s companies. He does have a company called A and A Security, of which he is the sole director. It was formed in 2019. He was probably Robinson’s minder at some point. He had a relationship with Paddy Kearney. No mention of it in the Belfast Telegraph article. Have they parted company? Why does this matter? Mains claims to have been in RUC Special Branch. Informed commentators are sceptical of this. Even if he was , or was controlled by MI5, I had lunch with him a few years ago. I asked him about this scenario. “A handler is informed by his high level tout that a RUC officer is the target for an under car bomb. If the operation is foiled, the high level tout, who provides quality intel on PIRA , will be compromised and likely killed. What should the State do?” I posited that the routine solution was to let the officer be killed. Mains looked me in the eye and said that that never happened. Dear Reader, you decide….

Irish Times article re Enniskillen

Irish Times article

 

 

I set out below an article written by Ed Moloney, who needs no introduction to scholars of the history of the Troubles.

 

Whether or not the letter is genuine, it raises, again, the question of the participation of State forces in the activities of PIRA.

 

Supporters of the Republican cause, including many lawyers, describe this as “collusion”.

 

It has been noticeable, in the articles written for the Newsletter , that not one participant has touched on this issue.

 

Instead it rolled out the usual State actors , like Collins and Matchett.

 

Equally, I am not aware of any “victims’” organisation exploring this issue at all.

 

The explanation, partly, may be the placing of ex State actors within these organisations. Take SEFF, it employs Peter Murtagh, ex State Spook. I’ve listened to SEFF’s pitch for victims and nowhere in it does it even acknowledge the possibility that State actors were involved with PIRA. The focus is mainly on PIRA killings of the security forces.

 

As always, Dear Reader, I urge you to judge for yourself.

 

Did MI5 Or The IRA Kill The Enniskillen Dead? The Evidence May Be In A Letter We Cannot See

by The Broken Elbow

Sometimes, I just despair of The Irish Times. 

There are times when it is not just essential to publish all the evidence behind a story but actually obligatory. And not to do so is a journalistic sin beyond comprehension.

In to-day’s edition of the Times, there appears a story which qualifies sans pareil for the above injunction.

The story deals with a letter purportedly written in mid-November 1987 by an MI5 officer working in Northern Ireland and addressed to Brian Lenihan, the then Foreign Affairs minister in Dublin, which claims that British intelligence knew in advance about the IRA’s plan to bomb the Enniskillen cenotaph in November 1987 but did nothing to stop it because it would create ‘a massive backlash’ against the IRA.

Civilians flee the scene of the Enniskillen cenotaph bombing

In fact a careful reading of the story about the letter suggests that not only did MI5 do nothing to stop the bombing but, according to the letter’s anonymous author, the spy agency actually manipulated the bomb’s timing mechanism so that it would cause the maximum damage to the IRA, i.e. kill the most civilians.

In other words, MI5 may have actually murdered the twelve civilians, not the IRA – although the IRA made it all possible.

The Times quotes the alleged agent as writing:

“Our section decided to change the timing device and let the explosion take place so that the IRA would score an own goal and create a massive backlash against itself,” he wrote.

“Our section also calculated that in the climate of a backlash against the IRA all kinds of security measures could be implemented including extradition.”

“If I had more courage I would come out openly and prove with more what I am now saying,” he wrote.

The Enniskillen bomb killed twelve people and dozens more were injured, some horribly, when they were engulfed in rubble. The backlash against the IRA was indeed considerable and arguably intensified a debate about strategy between the military and political wings of the Provos which ultimately took shape in the first IRA ceasefire of the peace process six years later.

The author of the letter describes him or herself as someone who had been working for  MI5 in the North for eighteen months or so in a section of the intelligence agency which specialised in infiltrating paramilitary groups.

He was so scared, he wrote, that he crossed the Border to post the letter, which has now been released as part the 1988 tranche of government papers eligible for publication.

There is no way of knowing whether this story is true or someone’s sick fantasy, or if the author of the letter was a real MI5 agent or the product of someone’s overactive imagination.

But it is surely not without significance that the Department of Foreign Affairs considered the letter important enough to preserve in the files and now to make public in the annual festival of governmental openness.

The Irish Times‘ readership, especially those who follow the newspaper on the internet, might be helped in their efforts to discern the truth, if they could actually see and read the letter, as The Irish Times‘ journalist who wrote the story evidently did.

In this day and age of iPhone and iPads capable of taking photos anywhere, and the ease with which the products can then be displayed on the internet, surely the paper’s readers should have been allowed that basic right?

Here is the Times‘ story in full:

The Broken Elbow | December 30, 2018 at 4:02 pm | Categories: Uncategorized | URL: https://wp.me/p1iwpM-3hw

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Flushing out the Special Branch

 

 

Readers of this blog will know that my basic premise is that , my parents’ murders included, the State permitted or acquiesced in the deaths of its citizens “for the greater good”.

Let me again follow the logic.

You are a handler. Your tout/informer/agent-it matters not on the nomenclature, has risen to an important role within PIRA. He is part of the targeting, planning and execution process. He is telling you who are in the ASUs, who the Quartermaster is, where the explosives are stored and who is making the bombs.  If you act on this information, you could disrupt activity by seizing the Semtex. You will have no evidence to put before a court , because the Supergrass system has been discredited and in any event your informer is unwilling to give evidence.

Alternatively, you could act to thwart the operations that your informer tells you about. After a few failures, PIRA are going to put two and two together and that’s the end of your informer.

So , in the grand scheme, some attacks have to get through.

A value judgement has to be made. Who do we sacrifice “for the greater good”?

Not Bobby Carswell, Jeffrey Donaldson, Gerry Adams, Brian Gillen or …

 

As the former head of MI5 said, life can be messy.

Some unimportant people have to be sacrificed to protect the informer. The higher up in the chain of command is the informer, the greater the ‘product’ and the greater the need to protect him.

That’s my theory, Dear Reader. So let’s test some aspects of it.

What rules applied to RUC Special Branch prior to 2000?

Let’s get it from the horse’s mouth. After my last blog was republished on a site called Expose the Republican Narrative a contributor , calling himself “Angus McTavish” offered a riposte.

I have found out  who this person is, but I’m going to call him, for the purposes of debate “Jonty”.

Jonty has taken the time to offer rebuttal to most of my points, though he fails  to recognise some tongue in cheek humour. But never mind.

He does , however , provide a window into the world of Special Branch, which he says he inhabited for a quarter of a century.

This is what he says about the rules.

 

“De Siva
4.5 – at the risk of repeating myself, De Silva seems to recognise a fact that has escaped the attention of both Nuala O’Loan and Michael Maguire, when they fail to recognise sufficiently, that intelligence agents, in order to operate as agents, must show support for the aims and objectives of their terrorist grouping. Furthermore, they must, if they are to be trusted within that group, carry out at least some actions which could be described as terrorist activity. Prior to RIPA (2000), this tactical imperative was conducted under the broad scope of agent handling tradecraft and regulated by the oversight of senior officers within RUCSB. It is recognised under RIPA (2000) as legal, justified and necessary deployment of CHIS/agents/touts, call them what you will. “

 

 

He goes on:

 

  • Informers/handlers were allowed to commit crimes, including murder – “In the pursuance of a goal of public safety, agents were indeed permitted by handlers to support terrorist groups and even on occasions to engage in criminal activity on their behalf. This behaviour was neither a crime by the agent or the handler and was finally given legal protection in 2000 under RIPA. Murder was not permitted and despite the best investigative efforts of journalists galore, Human Rights organisations (both legitimate and utterly biased), the PONI and several historical inquiries and reviews, not one handler has indeed ever been prosecuted, which in itself provides strong evidence that the claims made both here and on a multitude of previous occasions, are baseless. Any evidence to the contrary, has yet to be uncovered and the mantra is wearing distinctly thin now.”

So let’s deal with Jonty’s argument. The agent must carry out “terrorist activity” and “even on occasions to engage in criminal activity on their behalf” in order  to survive. “Murder was not permitted”, says Jonty. I wonder where that is in his rule book?

Prior to RIPA the United Kingdom’s Home Office guidelines on the use of informants was the only policy the  Special Branch  had to follow. The guidelines stated the police should never use an informant to encourage another to commit a crime; police officers should not counsel, incite, or procure the commission of a crime and protecting informants does not grant the informant immunity from arrest or prosecution for the crime they fully participate in.

 

Here is the full text. The typos and strange layout are original.

 

“Our rcfncncc: POL/ 69 1050/1/1

Four rtftrtnct:

HOME OFFICE

Horsefcrry House, Dean Ryie Street, London S.W.i

Telex: 24986

Telephone: 01-834 6655, ext.

 

12th May. L969

 

Dear Chief Constable,

HOME OFFICE CIRCULAR NO, 97/1969

Informants who take part in crime

 

The Home Secretary’s attention has been drawn to judicial comment in the appeal of Cork, Colman and Macro and to criticism of police action in several other cases involving police use of informants who took part in crime . He sought information about police practice from the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and through H.M. Inspectors of Constabulary. The Central Conference on 6th March gave an opportunity for a general discussion of practices and principles.

 

2* The Conference fully recognised that informants, properly employed, were

essential to criminal investigation and that, within limits, they ought to be protected. The risks attached to their employment were obvious, however, and safeguards were needed before use was made of an informant taking part in crime.

The Conference appreciated that circumstances varied so widely that it was difficult- to establish rules of general application; but the discussion

 identified the principles listed in the next paragraph.

 

  1. The Conference in general agreed on the following points.

 

(a) No member of a police force, and no police informant, should counsel,

incite or procure the commission of a crime.

 

(b) Where an informant gives the police information about the intention of

others to commit a crime in which they intend that he shall play a part,

his participation should be allowed to continue only. where :-

 

(i) he does not actively engage in planning and committing the crime;

 

(ii) he is intended to play only a minor role; and

 

(iii) his participation is essential to enable the police to frustrate

the principal criminals and to arrest them (albeit for lesser offences

such as attempt or conspiracy to commit the crime, or carrying of

weapons) before injury is done to any person or serious damage to

property.

 

The informant should always be instructed that he must on no account act

as agent provocateur , whether by suggesting to others that they should commit offences or encouraging them to do so, and that if he is found to have done so he will himself be liable to prosecution.

Ac) ,

The Chi- f Constable

(c) The police must never commit themselves to a course which, whether to

protect an informant or otherwise, will constrain them to mislead a court  

in any subsequent proceedings* This must always be regarded as a prime

consideration when deciding whether, and in what manner, an informant may be used and how far, if at all, he is to be allowed to take part in an offence.

If his use in the way envisaged will, or is likely to, result in its being

impossible to protect him without subsequently misleading the court, that must be regarded as a decisive reason for his not being so used or not being

protected.

(d) The need to protect an informant does not justify granting him immunity

from arrest or prosecution for the crime if he fully participates in it    with the requisite intent (still less in respect of any other crime he has committed or may in future commit),

(e) The handling of informants calls for the judgment of an experienced

officer, there must be complete confidence and frankness between

supervising officers and subordinates, and every chief officer of police

 should ensure effective supervision of his detectives; a decision to use a participating

informant should be taken at senior level.

 

(f) Payment to informants from public funds should be supervised by a

Senior officer.

 

(g) Where an informant has been used who has taken part in the commission

of a crime for which others have been arrested, the prosecuting solicitor,

counsel, and (where he is concerned) the Director of Public Prosecutions

should be informed of the fact and of the part that the informant took in the commission of the offence, although, subject to (c) above, not

necessarily of his identity.

(h) Careful instruction should be given to detectives in training.

 

  1. The Home Secretary fully endorses these broad principles. He feels sure that

they are already widely applied in the police service; but in view of recent public

interest he thinks it right to bring them to the notice of all chief officers of police. He asks that you will find means of commending them to everyone who may be concerned in your force. He has instructed H.M. Inspectors of Constabulary to pay particular attention, in the course of their inspections, to the arrangements made in police forces for supervision and training in these matters.

 

Yours sincerely,”

 

Here is what Chief Constable George Hamilton said in a speech in may of this year:

“The problem was much bigger and more complex than the “few bad apples” analogy that has been articulated previously. In the absence of any regulatory framework for managing “agents” police officers were left to set their own standards, they were unaccountable to the law because there was no law. They were unaccountable to their fellow citizens. Policing was being done in a vacuum that allowed unregulated practice. Honest individuals were placed in impossible situations, having to choose between bad and worse. Many people lived; but some people also died as a result of that practice.

The environment in which they worked was chaotic – terrorist attacks were happening on a daily basis, and many lives were being lost. Investigations struggled to keep pace with the rate of murder and serious injury.  The pressure was extreme. In these extraordinarily difficult and dangerous circumstances, the intent with which the vast majority of decisions were made was for the protection of the community. But they were, on many occasions, decisions and judgements that should not have been taken; and, I believe, would not have been taken if there had been a proper regulatory framework in place.

The RUC recognised the almost impossible situation they were in and the Da Silva Review makes reference to the fact that the RUC had asked Government for a framework, guidance or legislation on many occasions. Nothing was forthcoming.”

 

First, he is wrong and completely misleading to suggest there were no rules, secondly he appears to admit that agents were allowed to kill or be involved in killing.

Additionally, Northern Ireland had an interesting piece of legislation. The Criminal Law Act  (Northern Ireland) 1967, Section 5.

 

Penalties for concealing offences etc.

(1)Subject to the succeeding provisions of this section, where a person has committed [F1a relevant offence]F1, it shall be the duty of every other person, who knows or believes—

(a)that the offence or some [F2other relevant offence]F2 has been committed; and

(b)that he has information which is likely to secure, or to be of material assistance in securing, the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of any person for that offence;

to give that information, within a reasonable time, to a constable and if, without reasonable excuse, he fails to do so he shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment according to the gravity of the offence about which he does not give that information, as follows:—

(i)if that offence is one for which the court is required by law to sentence an offender to death or to imprisonment for life or to detention during the pleasure of the Governor of Northern Ireland, he shall be liable to imprisonment for not more than ten years;

(ii)if it is one for which a person (of full age and capacity and not previously convicted) may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of fourteen years, he shall be liable to imprisonment for not more than seven years;

(iii)if it is not one included above but is one for which a person (of full age and capacity and not previously convicted) may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of ten years, he shall be liable to imprisonment for not more than five years;

(iv)in any other case, he shall be liable to imprisonment for not more than three years.

So Jonty is wrong in so many ways.

  • There were rules
  • The rules did not permit the carrying out of continuous crimes by agents
  • Handlers broke the law if they turned a blind eye
  • RIPA did not provide legal protection for criminality by agents

The awful truth is that Special Branch were told that the “ordinary” rules regarding informers or agents did not apply to them.

 

I’m sure Dear Reader , you will look forward to a cogent reply from Jonty, Dr William or Dr Tim or any other member of the RUC who claims to have been at the cutting edge of Special Branch.

 

Next up for the blog will be a demolition of George’s recent speech.

The RUC and the Cosa Nostra

On 6th June 1990 there were, on conservative estimates ,100  RUC informers among the PIRA in Belfast.

Each had a team of  handlers, probably four in number, to cover sickness, leave etc. Four hundred so far.

The handlers had bosses; sergeants, inspectors, chief inspectors, superintendents etc.  Let’s estimate a further fifty senior officers.

Four hundred and fifty so far.

Then the meetings had to be covered by E4A and others, each one, day by day. Maybe another 100 officers , who would have seen the likes of Scappaticci, Sean Maguire, Brian Gillen etc “singing like canaries” in car parks in Hillsborough, Holywood , Helens Bay etc.

Five hundred and fifty.

The there was the “Hen House” where women, in serried ranks typed up the transcripts of the recordings of the meetings. Another fifty, at least.

Six hundred now.

Move to the civil servants in the NIO and others who read the ‘product’.

Then the Director of Public Prosecutions and his staff…

I’m rounding it up at seven hundred.

Maybe a third are dead.

But out there , today are several hundred people who could help the victims. They could tell the awful story of state involvement in supposedly terrorist murders.

Only a few  have spoken out.

Why? Like the Cosa Nostra , the silent ones  are motivated by money. Patten payments. Big pensions.

Before turning attention and criticism on the republicans, victims should ask themselves-why the silence? The answer is that the relevant RUC officers and civil servants are corrupt. Like the Mafia.

Who? Think of Flanagan, White, McQuillan , Matchett and Mains, all still earning  from the misfortunes of the victims and failing to tell the truth.

This is the real tragedy of the Troubles.

Marking twenty eight years

In any other jurisdiction, there are cold case reviews on a regular basis. Even the PSNI is embracing this idea , with the recent activity over the death of Inga Maria Hauser, found dead in April 1988.

As someone said , recently, sad as it is, why her?

The answer of course is that the huge lump of Troubles deaths involve the state and the vast store of documents, implicating it. There are stores  in Sprucefield, Seapark and Thiepval, where the army sits on a million copies. The state, in the form of Hamilton, Harris and the faceless people of MI5 will keep the lid on, as best they can.

All the citizen can do is keep probing.

What is additionally disappointing is that the new leaders appear to have gone to Spooks Academy.

Consider the letter written by the deputy director of the PPS in the case of Seamus Ludlow. His understanding of hearsay would shame a first year law student. How did he become deputy director and regurgitate all the lines of the state? Can you guess? Let’s hope he gets well spanked in the High Court.

As part of the week to mark twenty eight years since the murders of my parents, I am posting a secret document, giving an insight into how the state worked.

There will be other posts in this anniversary week.

 

Loughinisland, the strange case of K

Who is person K, referred to in the PONI report ?

His family live between Clough and Dundrum. He is related to Delbert Watson who was convicted of the murder of Jack Kielty in Dundrum in January 1988. Also convicted of that murder were David Curlett and William Bell, the driver of the getaway car. Doreen Watson, whose husband had been murdered by the IRA , sister of Delbert , was convicted of manslaughter.

K , according to Maguire, is a heavily traced terrorist. He has been linked to a conspiracy to murder Peter McCarthy  and the attempted murder of John Henry Smyth. He is alleged to have been involved in the murder of Peter McCormack in Kilcoo on 19 November 1992.

Police told Maguire that he was part of a UVF unit.

Dear Reader, you might pause here to wonder, if the RUC Special Branch, inter alia , was involved in collusion with terrorists, why it would divulge this information to the PONI. I leave that with you.

K and others were identified by Special Branch  to the Loughinisland MIT on the morning after the murders, as potential suspects.

K was arrested and interviewed several times on 18 July 1994. He provided an alibi for the time of the shootings. He said that he was in the Clough Inn with his girlfriend.

This alibi was not properly investigated, says Maguire . It is hard to see what the police could have done , two years later, to establish the truth of the alibi.

Maguire makes a mistake when he says at paragraph 7.169 that K’s hair sample was obtained and found to be a ‘microscopic match ‘ to a hair recovered from a holdall. The bag had not been found at this point.

The holdall was  not found until  4 August 1994. A hair found therein was examined and K was arrested again on 22 August  and the match was made. Caution should be exercised re hair matching after the FBI scandal regarding the science of hair matching.

However, police had a holdall in which they had found, inter alia,  the hair and some overalls. The overalls showed a link with the seats of a Triumph Acclaim car found in a field and bearing a resemblance to the getaway car. Close by was found the VZ58 rifle which was the murder weapon. Fibres from the rifle matched fibres recovered from the Triumph Acclaim.

It is tolerably clear that the Acclaim was the getaway car.

Also, found on a roadway , was a blanket. It has not been properly examined.

I do not know if K has a criminal record, or other matters which might be used as bad character.

I do not know if the hair provided DNA evidence to link K to the bag.

In any event, it is hard to understand why K has not been charged in connection with the murders.

Maguire provides no explanation.

Additionally he makes no case that K was in any way protected, especially by Special Branch. If there was “collusion” as widely defined by Maguire , one might have expected Special Branch to have with held information in respect of K. Instead, the morning after the murders, they tell the MIT about K. K is , one might have thought, a prime suspect.

Maguire makes no criticism of the rigour of the initial investigation.

What is always absent from these reports is the general context.

Viewed as a homicide in leafy Surrey, I’m sure there are points to be made. Northern Ireland was a different environment, with the police overwhelmed by terrorist  crime.

But the question remains.

Who is K and is he a State agent?

That, more than grandstanding by Maguire , would be a fact that the relatives of Loughinisland would prefer to know.