The Police Ombudsman has recently released a report on three killings; that of Henry Babington on 4th October 1989 and those of Constables Beckett and Myer on 30th June 1990.
I am particularly interested in the latter incident, it coming 24 days after the murders of my parents.
Readers of my blog will know that my special interest is the activities [or lack thereof] of senior RUC officers, Special Branch personnel [sometimes described as a force within a force] the Army and the Security Service, in respect of the murders.
Some of the striking features of my parents’ killings were that:
- There was no public appeal for witnesses or information, either immediately or at any time,
- There was no round-up of suspects, except for a character called Braniff,
- There was only a perfunctory search at the scene, missing the magnet,
- The fragments of the bomb were disposed of, and
- The file was put away in a cupboard months after the murders.
I was interested to see what assessment would be made of the constables’ murders, coming in much the same time frame.
There is an obvious difference , in that their killings took place in broad daylight in the city centre. No matter.
This is what the Ombudsman had to say:
“Having gathered and reviewed substantial documentation, the Police Ombudsman said the RUC investigation was “well resourced, well managed and conducted without any delay.”
It raised 338 investigative actions, recorded over 420 witness statements, and received over 190 messages. These were part of a police investigation that incorporated witness, forensic, intelligence, and suspect enquiries.
The Senior Investigating Officer’s (SIO) policy log, internal reports and briefings demonstrated that he viewed forensics as integral to his investigation and considerable work was done on examining descriptions given of suspects and preparing for arrests.
Initial information following the murders was promptly disseminated and the first arrests were made within hours of the murders. More followed, and there were a significant number of arrests.
However, there was insufficient evidence to charge any of these persons with offences linked to the murders.”
The Ombudsman then moved to consider the interaction between investigators and Special Branch. The underlining is mine.
“Although it is clear from police documentation that the SIO sought all relevant intelligence from Special Branch and that he utilised this intelligence from the day of the murder, the Police Ombudsman has identified failures in the non-dissemination of intelligence by Special Branch.
Intelligence is not evidence but the Police Ombudsman believes that this intelligence could have been capable of supporting new and further lines of the enquiry for the SIO, had he been made aware of them.
That revelation will hardly come as a shock to students of the Troubles killings. My opinion is that informers were protected at all stages of investigations by SB, even if there was a suspicion that they were committing offences well beyond any “agreement” with their handlers. Apologists, like Matchett, and others, refuse to even mention that participating informants existed.
“However, aside from early arrests, the available investigative material showed that where intelligence and information which named individuals allegedly involved in the murders was passed to the RUC investigation team, limited action was taken. This investigation has been unable to establish the reason for this.”
Next comes another old standard. The inexplicable and unexplained lack of activity and curiosity by SIOs. At that point in time, ‘ordinary’ detectives were constrained and controlled by SB. Arrests could not be made without their prior consent, that was a publicly known arrangement but who knows what other ‘informal’ arrangements were in place?
It is difficult to imagine that a succession of SIOs were incompetent, inept, and downright lazy, but perhaps they were?
This, as has been pointed out in relation to my father, was two of their own; compare that to the actions of police forces worldwide when a colleague is killed.
Then comes the most important finding.
“The Police Ombudsman considered the absence of action to be significant in one particular instance where information was provided by the military. Members of the military came forward to report that a person had told them that he witnessed the murders and knew the gunmen by name. They also provided a photograph. This did not result in any new lines of enquiry. “
“This information highlighted a person that potentially had very significant information pertaining to the identity of the gunmen. It is not known why the SIO did not generate any enquiries emanating from this intelligence,” said Mrs Anderson.
In any murder inquiry, when the SIO is presented with an eyewitness who knew the gunmen and saw the shooting – that is gold dust. The failure to follow this up is inexplicable, save for what I have written below.
The Police Ombudsman identified further missed investigative opportunities, including inaction after the planned arrest of two people on suspicion of the murders could not take place because the area had been designated out of bounds. The police records of the investigation do not provide a rationale for why there was no further attempt to speak to or arrest these individuals.
“Out of bounds” was a euphemism. It covered a multitude of scenarios. Genuine threats against uniformed officers, on patrol; planned operations, or SB controlling the situation for their own ends.
In view of the available evidence and information, the Police Ombudsman concurs with the concerns of Constable Beckett’s daughter about police failures to pursue evidential opportunities.
“I am of the view that the investigative failings in this case are so significant that it was incapable of leading to the apprehension and prosecution of the perpetrators, and therefore, was not Article 2 compliant,” concluded Mrs Anderson.
In overall conclusion, Mrs Anderson said:
“I am of the view, based on the available intelligence reviewed by Police Ombudsman investigators, that there was no intelligence that, if acted upon, would have been capable of preventing the murders of Henry Babington and Constables Beckett and Meyer.
“I believe that Henry Babington, Constable Beckett and Constable Meyer were the innocent victims of a campaign of terror mounted by republican paramilitaries. PIRA alone was responsible for the murders.”
It may well be that PIRA was “responsible” for the murders. That is not the whole story.
These murders were scouted, planned and as the late Ed Moloney said, were approved at the level of Martin McGuinness. It is inconceivable that one or more informers did not pick up this plan and convey it to their handlers.
Equally, it is borne out by the inexplicable failure of communication and the equally inexplicable indolence by the SIO, that other actors were at work.
Was the person who supplied the identities of the killers well placed to know them? Was he a businessman in the area? Was he well known to police, perhaps as an informant relating to ‘ordinary’ crime? Is that why his intel vanished into thin air?
A failed and flawed investigation into two of their own.
I do not know whether the present Chief Constable will apologise for these failings. Maybe he will say that in 1990, police were overwhelmed. Not something I recall being said at the time.
The smart OxBridge boys and girls in the NIO will chalk this off as another One Day Wonder and get on with the task of governing the colony.
Meanwhile , I and others haven’t finished with the RUC, the PSNI or the Security Service.
My condolences to the families of Henry Babington, Gary Myer and Harold Beckett. And especially to Constable Beckett’s daughter, who has campaigned so tirelessly.
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